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The planning, operation and control of the power system has been evolving since its inception. 
These changes are due to the advancement in science and technology, and changes in energy policy 
and customer demands. The envisioned power system - smart grid (SG) - is expected to have 
functional and operational capabilities that maximize the reliability, minimize generation deficit, 
and cost issues in the power system. However, many power systems in the world today still operate 
traditionally, with one-way communication and one-way power flow.  
Transitioning to a smart grid influences the protection schemes of the power system, as the smart 
grid is to leverage distributed energy resources (DERs) using distributed generation (DG) units 
and allow for bi-directional flow of power and information. Therefore, there is a need for advanced 
protection schemes. Wide-area protection (WAP) techniques are proposed as one of the solutions 
to solve the protection challenges in the smart grid due to their reliance on wide-area information 
instead of local information.  
This dissertation considered three WAP techniques which are differentiated based on the data used 
for faulted zone detection: (A) Positive sequence voltage magnitude (PSVM), (B) Gain in 
momentum (GIM) and (C) Sum of positive and zero sequence currents (SPZSC). The dissertation 
investigated their performances in terms of accuracy in detecting the faulted zones and the faulted 
lines, and fault clearing time. The investigation was done using three simulation platforms: 
MATLAB/Simulink, Real-Time (Software in the Loop (SIL)) and Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) 
implementation using Opal-RT and SEL-351A relay. The results show that, in terms of detecting 
the faulted zones, all the techniques investigated have 100% accuracy in all the 36 tested fault 
cases. However, in terms of identifying the faulted line in the faulted zone, the algorithms were 
not able to detect all the 36 tested cases accurately. In some cases, the adjacent line was detected 
instead of the actual faulted line. In those scenarios, the detected line and the faulted line present 
similar characteristics making the algorithms to detect the wrong line. For the faulted line detection 
accuracy, the algorithm (A) has an accuracy of 86%, (B) has an accuracy of 94% and (C) has an 
accuracy of 92%.  
The fault clearing times of the algorithms were similar for both the MATLAB/Simulink and real-
time simulation without the actual control hardware which was the SEL-351A relay. When the 
simulation was done with the control hardware through Hardware-in-the-loop, a communication 
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delay was introduced which increased the fault clearing times. The maximum fault clearing time 
for the techniques investigated through the HIL simulation are 404 ms, 256 ms, and 150 ms for 
the techniques (A), (B) and (C) respectively and this variation is due to the different fault detection 
methods used in the three algorithms. The fault clearing time includes communication between the 
Opal-RT real-time simulator and SEL-351A relay using RJ45 ethernet cable, these fault clearing 
times can change if a different communication medium is used. From the performance data 
presented, it is evident that these algorithms will perform better when used as backup protection 
since the common timer settings for backup protection schemes range from 1200 ms to 1800 ms, 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background  
Improvement in technology has changed the operation of the power system in recent years. 
Demand for electrical energy for domestic and industrial purposes is on a constant rise. These 
make the power system equipment operate close to their system capacity limit, making them prone 
to failures and disturbances. Despite all these, the performance indexes for today's power system 
are even higher as customers demand more reliability at the minimum cost possible. These are due 
to the following: the introduction of electronic devices that are sensitive to power interruptions, 
the use of electric vehicles, the introduction of distributed generations in the form of renewable 
energy sources, etc. Hence the power system is required from the operator's perspective to operate 
more efficiently, reliably, and resiliently.  
To achieve this, the term Smart Grid (SG) was introduced, referring to an electrical power grid 
which is smart in its operational and functional capabilities. Many utilities, institutions, and 
researchers came up with different kinds of definitions for the term 'Smart Grid,' the descriptions 
are based on the smart grid's operational and functional characteristics as well as the benefits 
derived from the smart grid. The flow of electrical energy and information is one–way only in the 
traditional grid, whereas the SG allows two - way flow of electrical power and information that 
will enable customer participation. For the smart grid to realize its vision, there are vital areas of 
the smart grid involving different technologies that must be developed, and these are the smart 
infrastructure system, the smart management system and the smart protection system [1].   
The SG is to operate with self-healing capability, resiliency to system disturbances and natural 
disasters, and adaptiveness to the system operational dynamics. These functional requirements 
have changed the protection needs of the grid drastically, and this is the role of the smart protection 
in the smart grid. This intelligent grid protection requires a wide-area view of the grid in real-time, 
adaptiveness to the power system dynamics, and the ability to detect and clear faults. Over the 
years, science and technology have been advancing. Currently, we have fast communication and 
measuring devices. Hence, the protection requirements of the SG are achievable.  
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Several researchers have developed algorithms and schemes for Wide Area Protection Systems 
(WAPS) for smart grid applications. Most of these schemes are only applicable as backup 
protection due to low-speed communication and the need to process massive amounts of data, 
which make them not fast enough for primary protection. The Wide Area Protection (WAP) 
techniques have the sole purpose of preventing cascading failure caused by failure to trip and 
unnecessary tripping of the protection systems based on local information. Hence their role as 
backup protection will still serve the purpose. However, researchers have suggested that with the 
advancement in communication technology where we have 5G communication technology in the 
pipeline estimated to become operational from 2020 and there have been some pilots projects, the 
WAP techniques can serve the purpose of primary protection [2].  
The main concern of researchers and utility companies as they seek to implement this new 
paradigm of protection is whether the WAP techniques have the needed accuracy and fault 
response time to serve their purpose of large-area blackout prevention. In this research, the 
performance of some selected Wide Area Protection (WAP) techniques in literature have been 
evaluated in terms of their accuracy and fault response time through MATLAB/Simulink 
simulation, real-time simulation (Software-In-the – Loop (SIL)), and Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) 
implementation.   
1.2 Research Hypothesis, Questions, Aim, and Objectives  
1.2.1 Research Hypothesis and Questions 
Electrical engineers have always sought to operate the power system with increased reliability and 
efficiency, securely and safely, to reduce failures which may lead to wide-area blackouts. 
However, technological limitations have made it difficult. The "Smart Grid" emerged to address 
the limitations of the power system (generation, transmission, and distribution) [3]. An aspect of 
the smart grid is wide-area protection (WAP) based on a wide-area measurement system. WAP 
aims at preventing massive area blackout of the power system, hence improving reliability. 
Various WAP algorithms with different accuracies and speeds have been developed in the 
literature. A WAP algorithm can prevent wide area blackout, however its performance must be 
investigated before implementation using simulation methods that will evaluate how it will 
perform on the actual system. Hardware-in-the Loop simulation using real-time simulators can be 
used to evaluate the expected performance of different WAP algorithms on the actual power 
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system. Based on the above, the research hypothesis statement is “With an advanced (fast) 
communication technology, WAP algorithms have the ability to serve as primary protection for 
the power system”. This will be investigated by answering the following questions: 
1. How different is the smart grid from the traditional grid? 
2. What role has WAMS in smart grid operations? 
3. How can WAMS enhance the Monitoring, Protection, and Control of the smart grid? 
4. How effective are WAP techniques in protecting the power system? 
5. How fast can these WAP algorithms act to protect the power system? 
6. With the advancement in communication technology, can these WAP techniques be used 
for primary protection? 
1.2.2 Research Aim  
To implement and evaluate wide area protection (WAP) techniques for power system transmission 
grids through MATLAB/Simulink simulation, real-time simulation, and Hardware-In-the-Loop 
(HIL) implementation. 
1.2.3 Research Objectives  
1. Provide Literature on Wide Area Measurement Systems. 
2. Provide Literature on Smart Grid Technology. 
3. Provide literature on power systems protection. 
4. Simulate a standard power system in MATLAB/Simulink. 
5. Evaluate selected algorithms/methods for power system wide-area protection using PMU 
data through MATLAB/Simulink simulation, Real-Time simulation using OPAL-RT and 
Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) simulation using SEL relays. 
1.3 Research Scope and Limitations 
The research is limited to investigating the use of Wide Area Measurement (WAM) data obtained 
from Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) technologies for protection in power systems to enhance 
their reliable operation and security. The research aims at implementing and evaluating selected 
techniques for Wide Area Protection System (WAPS) in the power system. These techniques are 
evaluated based on the accuracy of fault detection and the speed of operation, thus the fault clearing 
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time. The research is focused on methods for transmission grids protection; hence the power 
system under study is the IEEE 9-bus power system.   
1.4 Importance of this Research  
All over the world, electrical engineers are discussing transitioning to a better power system known 
as the smart grid. The smart grid has different aspects which must be thoroughly investigated 
through research before implementation. This research seeks to provide an investigation into an 
important aspect of the smart grid known as the wide area protection systems (WAPS) and its 
feasibility for smart transmission grids protection. This research is important as it provides 
foundation, guidance and information to engineers considering implementing this new protection 
system. 
1.5 Research Structure  
The remaining of the chapters of this dissertation are described briefly to put the work in context: 
Chapter Two reviews the literature on smart grid technology, power system protection, wide-area 
measurement system and wide area protection of the power system. 
Chapter Three gives an overview of smart grid operation, protection, communication, and 
hardware-in-the-loop simulation.  
Chapter Four discusses the wide area protection techniques implementation in 
MATLAB/Simulink. 
Chapter Five discusses the wide area protection technique implementation in real-time using 
OPAL-RT. 
Chapter Six discusses Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) implementation of the wide area protection 
techniques using SEL-351A Relay.  
Chapter Seven analyses and discusses results obtained from chapters four to six.  





CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents comprehensive literature on smart grid technology, power system protection, 
Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS), Wide Area Protection System (WAPS), and the 
Implementation of Wide Area Protection Systems.  
2.1 Overview of the Smart Grid  
Over the years, many countries have faced energy deficiency, and this has had a direct impact on 
the development of the nations, the economy, and the society. The environment has also been 
affected through greenhouse gas emissions due to the use of fossil fuels. These and many others, 
such as policy and regulation, quality of service, and integration of Distributed Energy Resources 
(DER), are the major drivers for a better and more efficient power system known as the ‘smart 
grid’ (SG) [4]. 
Although various definitions of SG are posed by several researchers, they all point to the same 
idea: the SG is expected to leverage advances in information and communication technology and 
electrical power system technology to solve the challenges faced by the traditional power system 
and achieve a reliable, safe, efficient, secure, resilient, and sustainable supply of electricity. 
Power system equipment manufacturing companies and utilities are shifting their focus to 
developing products that will serve the purpose of the SG. Also, many countries in America, 
Europe and Asia have been investing heavily in the SG infrastructure for some years now [5]. 
Countries that retain the traditional power system paradigm will soon be unable to get electrical 
equipment for their system maintenance. To improve the receptiveness of these countries to the 
SG paradigm, it is fitting to consider the question “is the smart grid completely different from the 
conventional one that we are used to?” The answer is: not really in terms of structure, but very 
different in terms of operational capabilities, functionalities and principles needed for effective 
management and control. 
The SG can be conceptualized as a system of systems, consisting of the smart infrastructure 
system, the smart management system and the smart protection system. The technical requirements 
of these systems and the aspects of the traditional system to be adapted to realize their deployment 
are discussed in subsequent sections. 
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2.2 Smart Infrastructure System  
We can subdivide the smart infrastructure system into subsystems known as energy, information, 
and communication subsystems; these are the infrastructure underlying the smart grid. This 
infrastructure system allows a two-way flow of electricity and data instead of the one-way flow in 
the traditional grid. The smart grid information and electricity flows allow power from the 
customers’ side onto the main grid and the participation of the customers in decision making on 
how they receive and use power through a smart metering system [6].   
2.2.1 Smart Energy Subsystem   
The energy infrastructure system of the electrical power grid consists of the generation, 
transmission, and distribution systems. In the traditional power system, the flow of electricity is 
unidirectional: from large generating plants (mainly hydro or thermal), through transmission and 
distribution networks to customers. The SG replaces this unidirectional flow of power with a bi-
directional power flow. The bi-directional flow of electricity and information in the SG enables 
customers to manage their energy consumption and generate power from RERs for self-
consumption or export to the grid. On the other hand, electric utilities are able to collect data about 
the state of the power system for efficient operation, and optimal response to changes in the system 
demands, supplies, and costs. Figure 2.1 depicts the diagrammatic narrative that describes the 
traditional grid operation [5].  
 




The power generation in the smart grid involves a central power station as well as an integration 
of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) into the power grid at the customer ends.  These DERs 
are predominantly Renewable Energy Resources (RERs), such as solar power, wind turbine, and 
in some cases, storage systems. The DERs reduce the Green House Gas (GHG) emission into the 
environment, provide more power generation, increase power supply reliability, and smoothen the 
demand profile. The DGs located at the customer ends can form part of what is known as micro-
grids, which feed power to the grid and can also operate independently of the grid (i.e., in an 
islanded mode) during a fault on the main grid to supply only the customer loads. Figure 2.2 
illustrates a generic structure of the smart grid.  
One of the disadvantages of these DGs, which is under research for solutions is that their power 
generation patterns, which are dependent on the weather (wind, sunshine, etc.), are far from being 
similar to the demand patterns of the customers, and their generation patterns are unpredictable. 
To find out how these DGs can be beneficial to the smart grid, the authors in  [7] investigated the 
impact of integrating renewable energy resources alone onto the power grid and then integrating 
renewable energy resources with storage devices.  
The investigation was based on power cumulative cost and user service reliability. It was found 
out that the integration of renewable energy resources alone can increase customer service 
reliabilities and reduce costs. However, integration of the renewable energy resources with the 
storage devices can smoothen bulk power generation, reduce peak load, and remove the 
uncertainties that are caused by integrating DERs.  
Also, the traditional protection of the power system is compromised when there is a greater amount 
of DGs incorporated onto the power system. The DGs influence the magnitude of the short circuit 
fault current and the direction of flow of the current, this affects the security and dependability of 
the protection schemes and gives false tripping. There is, therefore, the need for developing new 
protection schemes that will be suitable for the smart grid environment to mitigate the impact of 





Figure 2.2. A Generic Structure of the Smart Grid  [8] 
 
Infrastructure challenges in terms of components ageing and increase in load demand have called 
for the need of the smart transmission grid. The transmission system of the smart grid consists of 
smart control centres, smart transmission networks and smart substations, this is to incorporate 
innovative technologies such as power electronics and advanced communications into the 
transmission network monitoring, protection and control. The authors of  [11] did extensive work 
on the smart transmission system and identified some of the major features that will characterize 
it. The first of major features is digitalization, this is where the transmission system is going to 
employ a digital platform to enable system measurement for monitoring and protection of the 
entire transmission system. These digital platforms will also serve a purpose for sensing, 
computation and control, and maintenance of the system.  Also, other features identified are 
flexibility, intelligence and resilience; these features will enable the transmission system to: 
expand according to customers’ demands, be aware of the operation state of the network and 
withstand disturbances with self-healing for recovery after a fault condition. Furthermore, the 
paper identified sustainability where the transmission network is environmentally friendly enough 
with high efficiency, and customization that is, tailoring the network in accordance to the customer 
needs as other features of the smart transmission grid. The distribution system of the smart grid is 
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going to be characterized with several DGs as mentioned earlier, this is going to change the 
approach for management, control and protection of the distribution grid. 
a) Smart Information Subsystem  
The smart grid does not only depend on the improvement of the power infrastructure technology 
but also on the acquisition, management and use of information. Information about the state of the 
power system (voltages, currents, phasor angles) is paramount for effective monitoring control and 
protection purposes. With the improvement in technology, the measurement devices of the power 
system have also improved.  
There are now Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), smart meters and Phasor Measurement Units 
(PMU) for obtaining accurate information in the smart grid. The information subsystem of the 
smart grid has different levels that can be looked at separately. These include information 
measurement, monitoring and metering which involves smart meters, PMUs and sensors and 
information management which involves data modelling, analysis and optimization.  
b) Smart communication Subsystem 
Communication in power system is very important for proper management, control and operation 
of the power system and equipment. The traditional power system has devices which communicate 
among themselves like co-ordination in relays for protection and Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) for monitoring. The smart grid is very complex rendering these traditional 
communication technologies obsolete and therefore needs a more enhanced communication 
technology for real-time communication.  
In the smart grid, there is going to be a two – way flow of information, this communication can be 
classified basically into two. Firstly, the communication from sensors and electrical appliances to 
smart meters which can be achieved with wireless communication such as ZigBee, Z-wave and 
secondly, the communication from smart meters to the utility’s data centres which can be achieved 
with cellular mobile communication 3G, 4G/LTE and the current emerging 5G [12]. According to 
[12], the choice of communication must be based on certain communication requirements which 
are very paramount in the smart grid. These communication requirements include; security, system 
reliability, robustness, availability, scalability and Quality of Service (QoS).  
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2.2.2 Smart Management System  
The smart grid has a lot of capabilities, and one of such capabilities is the ability to manage the 
power system with the relevant technologies. For example, in the traditional grid, what they have 
tried to do is to match the supply with the demand. And often it happens that the peak demand 
which is about 20% of the total demand is used within 5% of the total time [13]. This makes 
generation capacities which are meant to meet peak loads redundant most of the time.  
However, in the smart grid, demand response is envisioned to solve this problem by rather 
matching the demand with the existing supply. This will be achieved through dynamic pricing of 
electricity using smart meters based on time of day to encourage users to use power during the off-
peak period when the price is low. This will then help to smoothen the demand profile. The key 
management objectives of the smart grid are energy efficiency, demand profile improvement, 
emission control and utility and cost optimization [1].  
2.2.3 Smart Protection System 
Protection has been in existence since the inception of the power system operations with first 
protection devices being the electromechanical relays. As science and technology advanced, the 
quality of power generation, delivery and demand have also increased, we saw the protection 
system evolving into a more efficient one. As we are heading into a new mode of power delivery 
known as smart grid, the protection system also needs to be transformed to meet the requirement 
of the smart grid.  
Two-way flow of information and power, integration of Distributed Generations (DGs) and 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), high-reliability requirement and the smart grid capabilities 
envisioned such as self-healing, resilience and stability make the traditional protection system 
inadequate for the smart grid operations. 
Some of the reasons for the need of a smart protection system include: first, the integration of DGs 
into the distribution networks of the smart grid has changed them from Passive Distribution 
Networks (PDN) as known in traditional grids to Active Distribution Networks (ADN). The 
development of these ADNs faces new challenges including protection and control in relays. With 
the integration of DGs the magnitude and the direction of the fault current changes, therefore, 
protection schemes based on local information is becoming irrelevant. Research is shifting towards 
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the use of wide-area information where the fault is calculated based on the entire regional power 
system perspective [14]. 
 Also, the protection schemes of the smart distribution grid become more complex especially if it 
involves Distributed Generations (DGs). This must be considered and dealt with to ensure 
reliability and security of the power system. This normally is due to the power from DG units 
which cause the power system to lose its radial configuration and eventually the co-ordination 
between the protective devices [15]. 
The smart protection system for smart grids can be achieved by taking advantage of the smart 
infrastructure available, which are the information, communication, and energy infrastructures. 
Technological advancement brought about an improvement in the measurement devices as we now 
have smart meters, and Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). These provide accurate measurement 
and ranges of information that can be used to enhance protection in the smart grid.   
2.3 Power System Protection  
The power system is very complex, and it is subject to various natural disasters as well as variations 
in loads of customers, and that is where protection comes into play to detect any anomaly and 
respond to it as well as restoring the power system to its normal operating state. The important 
element of the protection system in power system protection engineering is the relay which applies 
principles or schemes to detect anomalies. 
 The first protective relays developed were the electromechanical relays. As science and 
technology advanced, these relays were changed from electro-mechanical to semi-conductors [16]. 
Semi-conductor relays were later replaced with integrated circuits and then microprocessor relays 
which are being used presently. Figure 2.3 shows the different types of relays. The advances in the 
technology of the relays only change their performance in terms of security, reliability, speed, 
dependability, selectivity etc. 
2.3.1 Power System Protection Principles  
Principles, as the meaning implies are the fundamental truths and foundations on which things are 
built, the same way, in power system protection, there are certain principles which serve as a 
foundation for building any protection scheme. These principles have been developed in the last 
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century and are still in use today, despite the advancement in technology, these principles remain 
valid and they include: overcurrent, directional, distance and differential protection. 
 
Figure 2.3: Different types relays (a) Electro-Mechanical (b) Semi-Conductor (c) Micro-
Processor 
a) Overcurrent Protection 
Overcurrent protection in power systems was developed on the idea that the power system and its 
equipment have a certain current threshold value that can be allowed to flow, any current exceeding 
this value is dangerous to the health of the power system and could be caused by a fault or 
overloading and hence, must be disallowed to flow. The two causes of overcurrent in the power 
system which are overload and fault must be clearly distinguished by the protection schemes. 
There can be a temporary overload in the power system such as switching on of motor or a large 
load which may cause high current to flow. The overcurrent protection schemes in these cases are 
designed to sustain such occurrences.  
There are two types of overcurrent protection; these are directional and non-directional overcurrent 
protection. Directional overcurrent protection at first was mostly used for protecting transmission 
lines but currently, due to the integration of DGs into the distribution systems, they became 
necessary also in the distribution systems protection schemes. The non-directional overcurrent 
protection is mostly used for conventional or traditional radial distribution grids. 
The non-directional overcurrent protection basically monitors the current with a pre-set or 
threshold current value and then initiates definite minimum time (DMT) or inverse definite 
minimum time (IDMT) type of protection. As mentioned earlier, overcurrent due to loads must be 
distinguished from overcurrent due to faults. The non-directional protection achieves this by 
monitoring the current overtime typically between 4 – 40 ms so that an overcurrent that prolongs 
(a) (b) (c) 
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is classified as a fault and then the relay initiates a trip in the circuit breakers to isolates the fault 
[17].  
The directional overcurrent protection judges the current phasor against a reference voltage phasor 
measured at their measurement locations to determine the direction of a fault, hence the directional 
overcurrent protection depends on both current and voltage measurements. Looking at the diagram 
in Figure 2.4, a fault between the source and the relay is seen as a reverse fault whiles a fault that 
occurs between the relay and the grid is seen as a forward fault. In the diagram, Ipre is the pre-fault 
current, Irev is the reverse current seen by the relay and Ifwd is the forward current seen by the relay.  
 
Figure 2.4. Overcurrent Relay. Reverse fault (R) and forward fault (F)  [17] 
 
In recent years, researchers have mainly focused on directional overcurrent protection because of 
the integration of DGs into the power grid, which make power flow bi-directional. Hence knowing 
the direction of the fault is imperative to relay operations in the protection schemes. The work in  
[17] was geared towards using current only to determine the direction of the fault to save the cost 
that comes with having to measure both current and voltage.  
Papers [18] and [19] were concerned with developing an adaptive directional overcurrent 
protection scheme that can solve the protection issue that arises from the incorporation of 
Distributed Generations (DGs) and Active Network Management (ANM) in the distribution 
system. 
 In [18], the focus was on using an optimum protection setting for the overcurrent relay operations 
that can be applied to the network whether they are grid-connected or in islanded mode (unlike the 
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work by others where precalculated settings were used). In the case of precalculated settings, there 
can be several relay settings which are adjusted to the correct settings based on the network 
operation mode. Reference [18] stated that considering the effect of DGs and ANM on the 
distribution system and the number of possible network conditions that can be formed, it becomes 
unfeasible to have a precalculated group settings for all the network conditions hence they have 
proposed their approach.  
b) Differential Protection  
Differential protection is mainly used to protect power system equipment, transmission lines and 
feeders. It is based on Kirchhoff’s current rule which compares the entering current with the 
outgoing currents and if there is a difference above a preset value then it means there is an internal 
fault i.e. it is mainly used for protecting the lines and equipment against internal faults. In Figure 
2.5, in a case that there is an absence of an internal fault but an external fault or no fault at all, the 
current I1 = I2, but in the case that there is an internal fault on the protected line as shown in Figure 
2.6, then I1 ≠ I2. The relays will recognize this as an internal fault and trip the circuit breakers [20].  
 
Figure 2.5. External fault in Differential protection [20]. 
 
Figure 2.6. Internal fault in Differential protection [20] 
 
The principles of differential protection have been utilized in power transformer, busbar, and 
transmission line protection schemes. In [21] differential protection based on fuzzy logic and 
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Clarke’s transform was proposed which sought to deal with the issue that arises with some of the 
power transformer operating conditions which affect the normal differential protection behavior.  
Sanjay et al. [22] proposed an adaptive differential protection scheme for transmission lines which 
was later extended to protect series compensated transmission lines. In their studies, they 
performed analysis on the following important protection characteristics; dependability versus 
security and speed versus accuracy. Reference [23] proposed an equivalent based travelling wave 
(ETW) differential protection for transmission lines, their choice of travelling wave was because 
it is immune to distributed capacitance current and current transformer (CT) saturation. In their 
scheme, the capability of travelling wave was built upon by solving other problems as low 
sensitivity and low reliability that may arise due to communication traffic because of sampling 
frequency.  
c) Distance Protection  
Distance protection is mainly used for transmission line protection, the distance relay uses the 
impedance measured on the line to determine the distance of the fault from the relay. Distance 
relay operates in zones, where the zones of protection cover up to a certain distance on the 
transmission lines. The zones of protection of a distance relay are divided into three zones; zone 1 
protection which is the main protection covers up to 80% of the protected line and zone 2 
protection goes a little further than the zone 1 protection, it usually covers up to 120% of the 
protected transmission line. The zone 3 protection which is backup protection for the transmission 
line next to the one protected by the relay, covers the whole length of the protected line and up to 
80% of the next transmission line [24]. The illustration of the zones of protection can be seen in 
Figure 2.7.    
 




For correct operation of the zones, the zones of the relay are operated with different time delays. 
Zone 1 which is the primary protection is usually operated with no time delay at all. When a fault 
is detected by this zone, it is operated instantaneously. While zone 2 and zone 3, which are backup 
protections in the situation where the primary protection fails to operate, are given time delays of 
say 0.3s and 1s respectively.  
2.4 Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS)  
Before the development of Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS), the power system was 
being monitored as some are today, by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems and Energy Management Systems (EMS). The issue with these systems which led to the 
development of WAMS is that they give only local area view of the power system and hence they 
are unable to provide solutions during a cascaded outage. But WAMS is developed to effectively 
handle the events of cascaded outage through optimized stabilizing actions because of its entire 
network coverage [25].  
WAMS gives real-time information of the power system state, which has helped improve methods 
used for power system studies and analysis. Data obtained from WAMS is used for many 
applications some of which include real-time monitoring and control, transient stability analysis, 
voltage stability studies, state estimation, post-mortem analyses, power system restoration, 
adaptive protection, and power system planning [26], [27]. 
The hierarchical structure of Wide Area Measurement System consists of Phasor Measurement 
Units (PMUs) installed at different parts of the power system to measure and communicate voltage, 
current and frequency measurements, a Phasor Data concentrator (PDC) to collate PMU 
measurements received and a control centre where various applications and control algorithms are 
executed.  Figure 2.8 shows the hierarchy structure of WAMS. 
2.4.1 Optimal Placement of PMUs for full observability in WAMS applications  
The phasor measurement unit is a key technology in WAMS and its applications. It obtains GPS 
time-synchronized measurement needed from various parts of the power system and then 
communicates the data to a PDC which verifies and correlates the data by their time-tag to a higher 
level PDCs or to a control centre. PMUs are expensive and as power delivery is to be optimized 
with cost, researchers are looking into how to optimize PMU placement in the power system to 




Figure 2.8: The Hierarchical and Generic Architecture of WAMS  [28] 
 
 
Figure 2.9: A Generic PMU placement in a Power System 
 
Research on optimal placement of PMUs have several objectives. Work by [29] was based on 
determining the minimum number of PMUs needed to make a given power system fully observable 
using a binary search algorithm, where observability means all the states of the power system can 
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be uniquely determined. In [30]-[32] their objectives were to minimize the number of PMUs for a 
power system and minimize measurement redundancy. Lu et al. [33] proposed an optimal PMU 
placement in the power system for a reliable zero injections observation. 
2.5 Wide Area Protection System (WAPS) 
A cascading disturbance is a challenge for the utility industry due to the current complexities of 
the power system. The means to mitigate a disturbance that is fast spreading in the power system 
which will lead to a large area blackout has become an area of interest for researchers in recent 
years after the 2003 Northeast American blackout. Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control 
(WAMPAC) as a power system monitoring, protection and control paradigm has gained the 
attention both in the industry and academia. Out of this WAMPAC, we see emerging research 
topics such as Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS), Wide Area Control (WAC), Wide Area 
Protection (WAP) and Wide Area Protection and Control (WAPC). 
In this research, the focus is on the wide area protection, which is the use of wide-area information 
to implement a protection scheme that will be used to control the power system protective relays 
operation to mitigate system disturbances and limit the impact of faults. Figure 2.10 and Figure 
2.11 show the idea and the architecture of wide area protection, respectively. The architecture of 
WAPS in Figure 2.11 shows that, measurements data are taken from the power system by the 
PMUs and communicated to the wide area protection center through the local protection center. 
Trip decisions are made at the wide area protection center and sent to the breakers through the 
local protection center.  The wide-area information is mainly synchronized phasor measurements 
obtained from PMUs installed at various buses across the power system. In this section, various 
works by other researchers on the Wide Area Protection System (WAPS), how the scheme is 
implemented, and their test systems used are presented.  
a) Wide Area Backup Protection Schemes  
Backup protection in power systems is a very important aspect of the power system operation and 
its value can be assessed when we investigate the causes and nature of power system major 
disturbances. Conventional backup protection schemes are self-contained and depend on local 
information which make it difficult for the protection to distinguish between internal faults and 




Figure 2.10: Wide Area Protection of the Power System; the idea [34] 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Wide Area Protection of the Power System; the system architecture 
 
The advancement in communication technology and measuring devices leading to the 
development of the Wide Measurement System (WAMS) is bringing a solution to the problems 
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associated with conventional backup protection. Below are some of the works by researchers on 
using wide-area information instead of local information to develop algorithms and schemes for 
backup protection in the power system.  
Eissa et al. in [2]  proposed a wide area backup protection scheme for transmission grids known 
as wide-area differential protection (WADP) because it employs the principle of differential 
protection. The scheme uses phasor measurement units to obtain positive sequence voltages and 
current of the buses and compares these values to locate the bus nearest to the fault, then the 
absolute difference of the positive sequence current angles is calculated for all the lines connected 
to the bus to determine the fault line and location. This system was tested in 
MATLAB/SIMULINK using a 500kV Egyptian network. The time of fault detection is estimated 
to be 5 msec for all fault conditions and the relay is evaluated to be more suitable as a back-up 
relay and not a primary relay based on the communication speed for data transferring. 
In [35], the authors proposed a wide area backup protection system using synchro-phasor with data 
requirement analysis. In the scheme only positive sequence measurements were employed, the 
scheme was implemented and tested on an IEEE 57-bus test system, the paper indicated that, with 
fast communication media, the algorithm could have practical merits.  
In [36], a wide area backup protection using fault steady-state component for the development of 
fault detection algorithm was proposed. The algorithm works by forming protection correlation 
regions (PCRs) during normal operation of the power system. When a fault occurs, the algorithm 
locates the PCR where the fault occurred and then a fault correlation factor is calculated by which 
the faulted branch is located. The developed algorithm was tested with simulation on a 39-bus 10-
generator New England test system and the results show that, the method can detect the faulted 
branch with limited measurement points. 
Zhiqin He et al. [37], proposed a wide area backup protection scheme based on fault component 
voltage distribution. The scheme is composed of two parts: Fault area detection (FAD) and Fault 
Element Identification (FEI). After the faulted area is detected, only the substation that has the 
fault sends data to the regional wide area backup protection system, the scheme was verified using 
a simulation of the IEEE 10-generator 39-bus test system using PSCAD/EMTDC. The paper 
indicated that, the proposed method has the advantage of easy setting and low requirement for 
synchronized wide-area data.  
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Kalantar et al. [38] proposed an adaptive wide-area backup protection for transmission lines using 
phasor measurements. The scheme divides the power system into backup protection zones (BPZs) 
based on the placement of the phasor measurement units as well as the network topology. When a 
fault occurs in a zone, the entering positive and zero sequence voltages increases, and this is used 
to determine the faulted zone, after which the linear least square method is employed to find the 
faulted line in the zone, the scheme can adapt to the power system conditions. The system was 
tested using IEEE  9-bus and 118-bus test system. Simulation results verify successful 
identification of the faulted BPZ as well as the faulted line within the faulted BPZ with limited 
measurement points.  
In  [39], Javad Zare et al. wanted to address the communication delay constraint associated with 
the wide area backup Protection. The scheme was focused on regionalizing the power system using 
integer linear programming (ILP) by optimizing; the number and location of measuring devices 
(MD), the number and region of protection, the location of protection rooms and communication 
links between the MDs of the power system. So that the algorithm can be implemented in each 
region to reduce the computation burden. The system was tested using IEEE 57-bus test system. 
The paper concluded that; ‘execution of the proposed ILP model on different test systems reveals 
that with regionalization of the systems, WABP schemes can reliably be used in practice’.  
Manas Kuma et al. [40] proposed a wide area backup protection scheme for a series compensated 
transmission lines using phasor measurement units. The scheme employs the phase angle of the 
positive-sequence integrated angle (PAPSII) which is continuously monitored for each line at the 
PDC. This system was tested with real-time simulation using RTDS real-time digital simulator. 
The test results indicate that the proposed scheme can overcome the limitations of existing backup 






CHAPTER THREE: SMART GRID OPERATION, PROTECTION, COMMUNICATION AND 
HIL SIMULATION 
All over the world, utility companies, industry experts, power system operators and owners are all 
talking about the smart power system. The need to transition from the traditional ways of 
generating, managing, and controlling the electrical power system to smart methods has not been 
so emphasized as it is in recent years. Power system equipment manufacturing companies have 
moved their focus to produce products that will serve the purpose of the smart power system. This 
chapter explores in more details, the structure, functionalities, and principles of the smart power 
system.  
3.1 Different Sources of Power Generation in the Smart Grid 
Power system operation is faced with the challenge of running a true supply-on-demand system 
that is reliable [41]. In trying to run a system like this, what emerged was a supply that is 
controllable being matched with a demand that is uncontrollable and difficult to predict. In the 
smart grid, the power generation is not only from one large source such as a hydro-plant or thermal 
plant but with the addition of small generations known as DGs which are mostly in the form of 
renewables. With the inclusion of smart meters and other information structures, the demand can 
be matched with the supply without much difficulty.  
The various sources of power generation in the smart power system as mentioned earlier include 
all forms of power sources, renewables and non-renewables, because, in the smart power system, 
reliability is a key issue. Power must always be available when needed, storage systems are also 
going to serve as power sources at certain times and loads at other times. Other sources of power 
generation which are classified as renewables that are being integrated into the smart power 
system are solar energy, wind energy, biomass energy, wave energy, tidal energy, hydropower 
energy and biogas energy. 
3.2 Renewable Energy Integrations  
As part of the vision of the smart grid is to have little or no adverse effect on the environment, 
renewable energy sources have become the best alternative to fossil fuel generating plants in 
realizing this vision. Fossil fuels as a means of generating power emit a lot of carbon dioxide into 
the environment, which is dangerous, therefore, one of the smart grid goals is to move to 100% 
renewable power generations [42].   
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Integration of renewable energy sources into the smart grid poses numerous challenges, which are 
currently under extensive research. These challenges are due to the intermittent and fluctuant 
nature of renewables generations because they are weather-driven. Hence their integration requires 
new operational procedures other than the conventional one. In the smart grid, some of the 
advanced control techniques that are being proposed and used for effective integration of the 
(RERs) include demand response, demand-side management (DSM), efficient use of transmission 
system and intelligent energy storage.  
3.2.1 Variations in the Renewable Energy Generations 
The operation of the traditional power system is such that the generation is controlled to supply 
the estimated uncontrolled network load. That is, the supply is made to follow the variations in the 
load and not otherwise, except during peak periods when there is insufficient generation and then 
load shedding programmes are used to match the load with the available generation. The 
dependence of the supply on renewable energy resources such as solar and wind which are not 
dispatchable makes the load following policy in the power system operation not feasible.  
These RERs have minute-level, hourly-level, daily-level and yearly-level variations which must 
be factored into the generation plans to accurately predict the available power at any point in time. 
Solar energy, for instance, can change drastically with a passing cloud and wind energy also has a 
different generation pattern every day with rapid daily changes [43].      
In every region where a renewable project is carried out, there are different variation patterns 
depending on the climate of that region. The variations change with the seasons of the year; for 
example, a solar energy generation project carried out in a year is expected to have higher 
generation during summer and low generation during winter. Also, on a typical day during summer 
where the solar power plant is expected to output more power, there is a huge variation pattern 
depending on the time of day. This information needs to be available to the power system operators 
from the meteorological department of that region. Figure 3.1 shows a typical daily solar power 




Figure 3.1: Solar Power generation profile on a typical day [44] 
 
3.2.2 Demand Side Management to Solve Generation Fluctuations  
To solve the fluctuation issues that arise with power generation from renewable sources, demand-
side management (DSM) was proposed so that the load follows the available generation instead of 
the generation following the load [45]. The effects and benefits of DSM are enabling the use of a 
large share of solar photovoltaic systems. That is, it provides the means to balance the demand and 
supply in power systems with a greater share of renewable generators, including heat and power 
plants. It can also reduce the cost of power generation by eliminating expensive gas-fired, power 
plants which are only used a few times of the year to meet peak loads. Further, DSM improves the 
investment made in the transmission and distribution systems.  
DSM can be achieved by the installation of smart meters at the customer side bringing another 
benefit of accurate billing and having detailed customer information. The issue is with the 
technology that can be used to achieve the objective of the load profile smoothening hence getting 
rid of high peak demands. There are various programmes implemented towards DSM which 
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include: demand response, residential and commercial load management, energy conservation and 
energy efficiency programmes [46].  
Residential load management is geared towards reducing the overall power consumption in a 
household or shifting the demand to off-peak periods. Reducing the overall energy consumption 
can be achieved through energy conservation awareness, use of energy efficient appliances and by 
constructing a more energy-efficient building. Different approaches such as direct load control 
(DLC) and smart pricing have been proposed towards shifting the load to off-peak periods. Critical 
peak pricing (CPP), time of use pricing (ToUP) and real-time pricing (RTP) are the popular options 
available for smart pricing which encourages the consumers to voluntarily manage their loads [47]-
[49].    
3.2.3 Energy Storage Systems in Smart Grids 
The electricity generated from renewable sources is not dispatchable and the methods used to 
forecast their production is bound by uncertainty. In some countries, the electricity produced from 
renewable sources contributes to around 20% of their total energy demand. The power system is 
such that it requires a continuous balance between supply and demand. This balance is achieved 
in the traditional system using automatic controls that are supervised by human operators. 
Energy storage systems have been proposed as one of the solutions to address some of the 
challenges of smart grid operation, the energy storage system has the potential to improve 
variability and the accuracy of demand and supply prediction.  
Energy storage systems have been used in the traditional grid to perform three major roles:  
increase efficiency and reduce the cost of electricity, improve the stability and reliability of the 
power grid and enhance the power quality of the grid. In the smart grid, the major roles that energy 
storage systems have to play in order to achieve the smart grid vision is to provide flexibility for 
power systems with greater level of intermittent renewable energy integration and also to 
strengthen the grid resilience to power outages due to extreme events such as severe weather 
conditions and attacks on the cyber-physical infrastructure [50].     
Energy storage systems can increase efficiency and reduce electricity cost by what is termed as 
energy shifting. This can be achieved by storing the excess of energy which is generated during 
the time of day when the load is minimum (off-peak periods) and releasing it when the load 
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demand is maximum (peak periods). This kind of application requires storage systems which will 
be in service for several hours since the application involves constant charging and discharging.  
Whenever there is a mismatch between the supply and demand in the power grid, voltage and 
frequency are destabilized. The energy storage system in the power grid is used in this case as a 
means to provide spinning and non-spinning reserve for voltage control and frequency regulation 
in the events of a sudden large generation, loss of generation or load outages. A rapid response 
storage system is required for this kind of application to cater for the small-timescale fluctuations 
of both demand and supply and it may be required to operate for a short or long period [51]. 
Power quality problems include harmonics distortion of voltages and currents, voltage sags and 
swells, supply interruptions, transient and flickers. The concern for the quality of power supply 
has become very important due to the recent increase in the use of non-linear loads; computers and 
electronic devices. An energy storage system can provide sufficient energy to get rid of the short-
term power quality issues [52], [53].     
3.3 Smart Grid Protection  
There are many important areas that need to be researched and implemented in order to bring to 
realization, the smart grid vision. One of these important research areas is new trends for power 
system protection. Under this aspect of the smart grid, we have wide area protection, adaptive 
protection and protection with self-healing capabilities. The flow of fault current in the smart grid 
is from different directions as shown in Figure 3.2 because of the incorporation of several DG units 
into the smart grid. Hence, a protection technique that can detect, locate and identify faults in this 
scenario is required. The existing protection schemes and techniques were designed for the 
traditional grid which has power generation at one point and hence fault currents flowing from 
only one direction.  
Further, the robustness and resilience of the power grid are paramount due to the many events that 
put the power grid at risk. The protection system plays a major role in maintaining this resiliency 
and robustness. A protection technique that will provide self-healing capability to the smart grid 
is under intensive research in the industry and academia, since reliability is one of the problems 




Figure 3.2: Fault current from different directions in the Power grid due to the DG units [54] 
 
3.4 Communications in Smart Grid 
The definition of the smart grid or the smart power system mentioned earlier in the introduction 
states that; ‘the smart grid is the convergence of the advancement in power system with 
communication technology to provide efficient, reliable and safe power supply’. This definition 
shows that communication technology is an important aspect of the smart grid. The smart grid has 
two-way communication as opposed to the one-way communication in the conventional grid. The 
two-way communication will provide a real-time interactive channel between the consumers and 
the power utility companies. This real-time communication will help users get information about 
their power consumptions and flexibly adjust the time of use of their appliances based on electricity 
pricing. The power companies, in turn, can also retrieve user’s power usage information, manage 
the connections of distributed energy resources, and regulate the load on the grid by controlling 
the users’ appliances.  
To achieve this communication requirement in the smart grid, there are different communication 
technologies available to the power utility companies. The right form of communication 
technology must be selected for the right application in order to achieve the desired results. The 
two major forms (mediums) of communication available are wired and wireless. Wireless 
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communication has its own advantages such as high rate of success, fast communication, easy 
installation, and maintenance but has the problem of being vulnerable to interference, 
communication quality and the distance of communication is greatly affected by walls. This means 
that wireless communication is useful for some power system applications and not useful for other 
applications [55]. The major issue with the wired communication is that they are capital intensive. 
The data transmission rate of the communication technologies is one of the major factors of 
consideration when selecting the type of communication technology for a particular power system 
application. For example, wide area measurement systems which involve collecting PMU data 
from several points of the power system will have large volumes of data to be communicated to a 
centralized centre, hence, this kind of application needs a communication technology with a very 
high data transmission rate.  
3.4.1 Different Communication Technologies for the Smart Power System  
There are various forms of applications in the smart grid environment which require incorporating 
advanced information technologies and intelligent communication networks. These applications 
include substation automation, automatic meter reading, advanced metering infrastructure etc.  
This section discussed the various communication technologies available for smart grid 
applications and compares them in terms of their data rate and distance coverage. 
The choice of a communication network architecture design for a particular smart grid application 
must meet specific requirements such as reliability, latency, security, bandwidth as these are 
crucial for a reliable, affordable and sustainable power grid. Table 3.1 presents a comparison of 
both wired and wireless communication technologies.  
3.4.2 The Smart Power System Communication Network Architecture, Data Rate and Coverage 
Range Requirements. 
The communication architecture of the smart grid can be represented using a hierarchical structure. 
The layered architectures are applicable at various points of the power system. They comprise of 
wide area network (WAN), neighborhood area network (NAN)/field area network (FAN) and 
home/local area network at the customer premises. Figure 3.3 shows the communication 
architecture in smart grid, data rate and coverage range requirement.  
29 
 
3.4.3 Communication Network Requirement for different Smart Grid Applications 
There are various smart grid applications that need network communication technologies. The 
communication requirements in terms of data rate, security, bandwidth, latency, and reliability 
vary and are specific for each type of application. 
An application such as home automation will require a communication technology with short 
coverage distance and low data rate, in this case, network communication technologies such as 
Zigbee, WLAN, Z-wave and PLC are applicable.  For an application in a wide area network such 
as synchrophasors, data communication will require a network that supports a higher data rate and 
can provide a long coverage distance; for this type of application, fibre optic communication 
technology will be suitable. Table 3.2 shows the various applications in smart grid, their 
communication requirements and the choice of communication technology that may be applicable. 
 
  







Table 3.1: Comparison of different communication technologies [56] 
Technology  Standard/Protocol Data Rate Coverage Range 
Wired Communication Technologies 
Fiber Optic PON 155Mbps – 2.5Gbps Up to 60 km 
WDM 40 Gbps Up to 100 km 
SONET/SDH 10Gbps Up to 100 km 
SDL  ADSL 1-8 Mbps Up to 5 km 
HDSL 2 Mbps Up to 3.6 km 
VDSL 15-100 Mbps Up to 1.5 km 
Coaxial Cable DOCSIS 172 Mbps Up to 28 km 
PLC Home Plug 14 – 200 Mbps Up to 20 m 
Narrowband 10 – 500 kbps Up to 3 km 
Wireless Communication Technologies 
Zigbee Zigbee 250 kbps Up to 100 m 
Zigbee Pro 250 kbps Up to 1600 m 
WLAN 802.11x 2 – 600 Mbps Up to 100 m 
Z-wave Z-wave 40 kbps Up to 30 m 
Cellular  2G 14.4 kbps Up to 50 km 
2.5G 144 kbps 
3G 2 Mbps 
3.5G 14 Mbps 
4G 100 Mbps 
5G 10 Gbps 







Table 3.2: Smart grid applications and network communication technologies that will meet their 
requirements  [56] 
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3.5 Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) Simulation 
To better understand the performance of a power system control hardware, the hardware must be 
tested within the real power system. This testing of how the control hardware will interact with the 
power system cannot be tested on the actual power system as by doing so, customers loads will be 
interrupted. To build a real power system for the sole purpose of testing control hardware 
algorithms will be very expensive, hence by replacing the actual power system with the real-time 
simulated one, these problems can be solved [57].  
Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), OPAL-RT Real-Time Simulator, Simulink real-time using 
speedgoat target hardware etc. provide platforms for simulating the power system in real-time. 
Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation is widely used in the automotive, aerospace and defense, 
and industrial automation and machinery industries to test embedded designs. HIL is currently 
being adopted in medicine, communication, and several industries. The most common HIL 
simulation examples include [58]: 
1. Aerospace and defense: Flight simulators and flight dynamic control, where it is too 
expensive to test the control algorithm on the actual aircraft. 
2. Automotive: Vehicle dynamics and controls, where it is impractical to test functionality on 
the road in the initial phases. 
3. Industrial automation: Controller plant-testing, when stopping the production or assembly 
line to test control algorithms involves a huge amount of resources and business loss. 
4. Power System Protection and Control: Testing of protection and control algorithms, where 
testing on the actual power system is dangerous and will also interrupt customer loads.  
3.5.1 Importance of Real-Time and HIL Simulations.  
The idea of real-time simulation became very important because we want to test the performance 
of our control algorithms using the real physical hardware that will be used in real life. There are 
different reasons why it is important to do real-time simulations. One of these reasons is that it 
helps engineers to reduce cost in fixing errors in any control algorithms as the errors are detected 
at the design stage. The cost involved in fixing an error at the design stage is almost zero, but when 
the control hardware is deployed, it costs so much to fix the same error. Hence by doing real-time 
and HIL simulations using the real hardware that will be deployed, it helps to identify any error 
that will occur and then fix it before deployment.   
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The real-time simulation also helps us to perform tests on systems in the laboratory which 
previously would not be possible to do as those tests can only be done on the field. Tests performed 
on the field are difficult, expensive and hazardous. The real-time simulation allows us to perform 
verifications of our design all along with the project, detect errors at early stages and gives room 
for infinite test capabilities.   
Figure 3.4 shows the cost of fixing an error at the different stages of the manufacturing and 
deployment of any control hardware. Figure 3.5 shows the old and new approaches to error 
discovery. In the old approach, errors are only discovered during tests performed on the field, 
whereas in the new approach, with the aid of real-time and HIL simulations, errors can be 
discovered even at the design stage. 
 
 





Figure 3.5: Old and New approach for error discovery in systems development [59] 
 
3.5.2 Real-Time Simulation and Offline Simulation  
Simulation is the representation of the operation or features of a system through the use of the 
other. One cannot talk about hardware-in-the-loop-simulation without talking about real-time 
simulation. In simulation, there are different types of simulation solvers used. Discrete time with 
constant time-step is the simulation type suitable for real-time simulation. In this type of 
simulation, time moves forward in steps of equal duration. To solve mathematical functions and 
equations at a given time-step, each variable or system state is solved successively as a function 
of variables and states at the end of the preceding time-step. During discrete simulation at a fixed 
time-step, the amount of real-time needed to compute all equations and functions consisting a 
system during a given time-step may be shorter or longer than the duration of the simulation time-
step. Figure 3.6 (a) and Figure 3.6 (b) show these scenarios. In (a), the computing time is shorter 
than the fixed time-step; this type of simulation is also referred to as accelerated simulation 
whereas in (b), the computing time is longer; these two types of simulation are known as offline 
simulation. In both cases, the time when the results become available is not relevant, the objective 
mainly with offline simulation is to obtain results as fast as possible.  
However, during real-time simulation, the accuracy of the computations does not only depend on 
the precise dynamic representation of the system but also on the length of time used to produce 
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the results. Figure 3.6 (c) shows a scenario for real-time simulation. For a real-time simulation to 
be valid, the simulation must accurately produce the internal variables and outputs of the 
simulation within the same length of time that the real-world (physical) systems would. The real-
time needed to compute the solution at a given time step must be shorter than the actual clock 
duration of the simulation time-step. This enables the real-time simulator to perform all operations 
necessary to make a real-time simulation relevant, including driving inputs and outputs (I/O). 
Figure 3.7 shows the simulation time-step requirements by application to achieve real-time 
simulation  [60]. 
 
Figure 3.6: Real-Time Simulation requirements [60] 
 
3.5.3 Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) Simulation Configurations for Power System Studies 
The concept of HIL simulations can be applied in different ways to test different systems. The 
basic application of HIL in power system engineering includes: Controller Hardware-in-the-Loop 




Figure 3.7: Simulation Time-Step by Application for Real-Time Simulation [60] 
 
A. Controller Hardware-in-the-Loop (CHIL) 
Controller hardware-in-the-Loop simulation allows many control hardware such as controllers for 
inverters, capacitor banks and smart thermostat to be evaluated with simulated inputs. The 
hardware under test is generally an embedded controller with inputs and outputs of small-signal 
levels [61]. 
A power system simulation running on a digital real-time simulator (DRTS) is configured with the 
actual grid conditions to provide realistic input data to the controller hardware. The output signals 
from the controller hardware are fed back as inputs to the power system simulation running in real-
time. The power system simulation is updated based on the signal received from the controller 
hardware which also updates the signal sent to the controller hardware. Analog to Digital 
converters (ADC) and Digital to Analog Converters (DAC) are needed for the exchange of data 
between the power system simulation running on the DRTS and the controller hardware [62].  
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B. Power Hardware-in-the-Loop (PHIL) 
This hardware-in-the-Loop simulation is an extension of CHIL which incorporates hardware with 
inputs and outputs of higher voltages, it allows power hardware with its embedded control to be 
interfaced with the executed power system running on the DRTS. The power hardware and its 
embedded control can then be tested under realistic but simulated conditions. The power hardware 
needs an operational power; AC or DC or both that is consistent with the conditions in the power 
system simulation [61]-[64]. Figure 3.8 shows a diagrammatic illustration of PHIL and CHIL. 
 
Figure 3.8: Illustration Comparison of CHIL and PHIL simulations [64] 
 
3.5.4 Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) Simulation of Power System Relay  
In this research, the focus is to test and evaluate the performance of different wide area protection 
algorithms, hence the hardware under test for consideration here is the power system relay 
specifically SEL-351A relay. A power system relay requires higher voltage (Power) signals of 
300 Vac continuous and 1 Amp or 5 Amps continuous from the power system simulation that is 
executed on the DRTS, hence using these signals for the HIL test is considered a power hardware-
in-the-loop simulation (PHIL). The DRTS that is used for the real-time simulation of the power 
system in this research is the OPAL-RT real-time simulator. The output and input signals of the 
simulator have a dynamic range of 32V peak-peak and 60V peak-peak maximum respectively and 
a few milliamps (mA) for analog signals. The digital output has a user-defined range of 5 to 30 V 
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with a maximum output current of ± 50 mA per channel and a flexible input of 4 to 30 V with an 
input current of 3.6 mA. This requires a power interface (amplifier) to make the interaction 
possible when doing HIL.  
However, SEL relays provide a low-level test interface with a maximum input voltage of 9 V peak-
peak which allows for testing of the relays using low-level voltage and current signals. This makes 
controller hardware-in-the-loop simulation and relay testing using the Opal-RT and RTDS real-
time simulator possible without amplifiers. Many researches in literature including  [65]-[67], have 
made use of the low-level test interface provided by SEL relays for power system protection testing 
through HIL. The laboratory used for this research does not have amplifiers hence the HIL testing 
in this work made use of the low-level test interface of the SEL relays. Figure 3.9 depicts the 
interactions between MATLAB/Simulink, Opal-RT simulator, amplifier and the SEL-351 relay 
during PHIL simulations.   
 








CHAPTER FOUR: MATLAB IMPLEMENTATION OF WIDE AREA PROTECTION ON A 
POWER SYSTEM  
In this chapter, the simulation of some selected wide-area protection schemes on the IEEE 9-bus 
power system in MATLAB/Simulink is discussed. The performances of the protection algorithms 
during the MATLAB/Simulink simulation are also presented. 
4.1 Software Simulations  
In order to test the behavior of the power system when a fault occurs especially its effect on voltage, 
current and frequency, the simulation of the power system was started with a single bus and the 
number of buses were increased progressively. These simulations were carried out and the 
knowledge gained was transferred to the actual test system under study-the IEEE 9-bus system. 
Some of the results of these simulation are shown in Appendix D.   
4.2 Wide Area Protection algorithm simulations on IEEE 9-bus system 
The IEEE 9-bus 3-generator power system was chosen as the test system for evaluating the various 
selected algorithms for wide area protection (WAP). The diagram of the IEEE 9-bus power system 
is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 




4.3 Selected WAP Techniques 
The three algorithms selected from the literature for implementation and comparison include: 
• WAP Technique A: A novel backup wide-area protection technique for power system 
transmission grids using phasor measurement unit (PSVM for faulted zone detection)  [2]. 
• WAP Technique B: A new decentralized approach to wide-area backup protection of 
transmission lines (GIM for faulted zone detection) [70]. 
• WAP Technique C: An adaptive PMU-based wide area backup protection for power 
transmission lines (Sum of positive and zero sequence currents for faulted zone detection) 
[38]. 
4.3.1 Similarities Existing Between the Chosen Algorithms 
In order to compare two or more algorithms accurately, they must have certain things in common 
which will be the basis for drawing conclusions on their effectiveness. These algorithms have been 
carefully selected to ensure their performance evaluations are comparable. The following are the 
common features of the algorithms: 
1. The use of Phasor Measurement Units data 
2. Formation of zones of protection 
3. Determination of faulted zones 
4. Determination of faulted lines in a faulted zone 
5. Used for Transmission line protection 
4.3.2 Differences that Exists Between the Chosen Algorithms 
Despite the similarities among the algorithms, significant differences exist among them. For 
instance, the data used by one algorithm for determining the zone that has a fault is different from 
the data used by the other. These differences help to measure their performance and effectiveness 
in terms of accuracy and speed. Table 4.1 shows the differences that exist among the algorithms. 
4.4 WAP Technique A [2].  
The technique uses the formation of protection zones based on the PMUs placement in the power 
system and the network topology. When a fault is detected in a particular protection zone, then the 
information of the various connected lines in that zone is sent to the protection centre to detect the 
particular line on which the fault occurs. 
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The data that are measured by a PMU include positive sequence magnitude and angle of voltages 
and currents, voltage and current phasors and frequency. In this algorithm, the data used for fault 
detection are positive sequence voltage magnitudes nV  and positive sequence current angles I  
A. Formation of Backup Protection Zones  
The protection zones are formed based on the PMU placement in the power system and the network 
topology. As shown in Figure 4.3, buses 4, 7 and 9 are PMU buses hence the three zones in the 






B. Faulted Zone Identification 
The algorithm compares the positive sequence voltage magnitude (PSVM) of PMU buses in each 
zone of protection. The zone with the minimum positive sequence voltage magnitude below a set 
threshold has the fault. Mathematically the statement can be expressed as:  
𝑀𝑖𝑛{|𝑉1|, |𝑉2|, … |𝑉𝑚|, … |𝑉𝑛|} < 𝑉𝑡ℎ                         
where 𝑉𝑛 is the positive sequence voltage magnitude measured by PMUs in zone “1”, “2” … 
“m” to “n” and 𝑉𝑡ℎ is the threshold for PSVM. 
C. Faulted Line Identification 
When the faulted zone is detected, then the absolute angle of the positive sequence current angle 
is used to detect the line with the fault. If a zone labelled “m” is detected as the zone with the fault, 
then the absolute angle of all lines connecting to the PMU bus will be compared and the maximum 
one is the line with fault.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥{|∆𝛷𝑚1|, |∆𝛷𝑚2|, … |∆𝛷𝑚3|, … |∆𝛷𝑚𝑛|}             
where  |∆𝛷𝑚𝑛| = |𝛷𝑚𝑛− 𝛷𝑛𝑚|                                    
D. Summary of Fault detection algorithm       
The faulted zone is detected by monitoring the positive sequence voltage of the various protection 
zones. The zone with the minimum positive sequence voltage that is below a certain set threshold 
(that is obtained from the simulation of the power system) has the fault. After that, the absolute 
magnitude of the current angle difference of the various connected lines to the PMU bus in that 
zone is calculated, and the line with the maximum value has the fault. The flowchart for this wide 







Figure 4.2: The flow chart for the WAP Technique A 
 
Before implementing the algorithm, no-fault, single phase to ground fault and three phase fault 
were simulated to determine the threshold for the Positive Sequence Voltage Magnitude (PSVM) 
for identifying the faulted zone in the IEEE 3-generator 9-bus system and the following results in 
Table 4.2 were obtained. The faults locations were changed, however, the maximum PSVM is 
taken as the threshold. The diagram in Figure 4.3 shows the IEEE 9-bus power system with the 
different zones of protection and the PMU buses based on this WAP algorithm. From the table, 
when there is no fault, the PSVM of the PMU buses ranges from 0.85 to 0.87. A zone with the 
fault has the PSVM of its PMU bus smaller than the other PMU buses and this is indicated in red 
in the table.     
Table 4.2: Positive sequence voltages in per unit obtained from PMUs for faulted zone 
identification 
 PMU 1 PMU 2 PMU 3 
No Fault 0.85 0.86 0.87 
Fault Type (L-L-L) (L-G) (L-L-L) (L-G) (L-L-L) (L-G) 
Zone 1 8.03e-6 0.6094 0.2801 0.6954 0.2641 0.6974 
Zone 2 0.2922 0.6965 7.37e-6 0.6267 0.2163 0.6904 




4.4.1 MATLAB/Simulink Results of the WAP Technique A Implementation 
 The IEEE 9-bus 3-geneartor power system was simulated in MATLAB/Simulink and the 
algorithm implemented to detect various faults; this was done to test the accuracy of the algorithm. 
The voltage and current recordings (waveforms) of all the PMU buses following a three-phase (L-
L-L-G) fault simulated in zone 3 at bus 3 are shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 respectively. The 
highest fault current as well as a significant reduction in the fault voltage were recorded at the 
PMU located at bus 9 because the fault is in zone 3. These characteristics are important for 
determining the faulted zone in the power system.  
 
Figure 4.3: IEEE 9-bus power system with the different zones of protection and PMU buses for 





Figure 4.4: Voltages of PMU buses in zones 1 (a), 2 (b) and 3 (c) for a fault in zone 3. 
 
 




4.4.2 Evaluation of WAP Technique A in MATLAB/Simulink 
The algorithm was evaluated in terms of the speed it takes to detect and clear all types of faults as 
well as the accuracy in detecting all faults on the various lines of the IEEE 9-bus system. Different 
types of faults were simulated on each line and the algorithm was used to detect the zone and the 
line on which the fault occurred. The fault detection accuracy is given by the following equation: 
Zone detection accuracy = 
Number of zones accurately detected
100%
Total number of faults tested 
  
Line detection accuracy = 
Number of lines accurately detected
100%
Total number of faults tested 
  
To determine the fault clearing time of the algorithm, the voltage and current waveforms of the 
bus closest to the circuit breaker was recorded. For WAP technique A, the fault clearing time varies 
depending on the type of fault, the range of the fault clearing time is between 15 ms to 35 ms.   
 From Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, the time period from when the waveforms begin to distort to 
when the waveforms recovered or stabilized is the fault clearing time. The current and voltage 
waveforms show that a two-phase fault (L-L) was cleared in 0.03 seconds and a three-phase to 
ground fault (L-L-L-G) was cleared in 0.015 seconds during the MATLAB/Simulink simulation. 
Table 4.3 shows the time it took the algorithm to clear the different types of faults tested during 
simulations, the time taken to clear the faults is higher for single-phase to ground fault and lower 
for three-phase to ground faults. The accuracy of the algorithm in detecting all faults was tested, 
Figure 4.8 shows a block diagram of how a faulted line is detected. Some of the faulted lines 
detected and the actual lines on which the faults occurred are indicated in Table 4.4. The accuracy 
is determined by the ability of the algorithm to correctly determine the actual faulted zone and line 






Figure 4.6: Current and voltage waveforms before, during and after a fault (L-L) in Simulink  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Current and voltage waveforms before, during and after a three-phase to ground 
fault (L-L-L-G) in Simulink 
 
 




Fault Clearing Time(seconds) 
Fault Type L-G L-L L-L-G L-L-L-G 
Zone 1 0.035 0.03 0.025 0.02 
Zone 2 0.035 0.03 0.026 0.02 





Figure 4.8: Block diagram used to test the accuracy of the Algorithm 
4.5 WAP Technique B [70] 
This scheme also uses the decentralized approach by forming a vulnerable protection zone (VPZ) 
based on the placement of the generator in the power system.  The Gain in Momentum (GIM) of 
the generators are used to locate the vulnerable protection zone and then the positive sequence 
voltage magnitude (PSVM) of each bus in the VPZ is used to detect the bus closest to the fault, 









Table 4.4: WAP Technique A accuracy in detecting faults 
Faulted line Faulted Zone Type of fault Zone detected  Line detected  
 














































































































A. Formation of Backup Protection Zones 
The protections zones (PZs) of the power system are formed in corresponding to the generator 
buses in the power system, this is because the algorithm uses the Gain in Momentum of the 
generators to detect a vulnerable protection zone. The protection zones are as illustrated in Figure 
4.3 similar to WAP technique A.  
B. Faulted Zone Identification 
The gain in momentum of each generator bus is closely monitored with a certain threshold obtained 
from the simulation of the power system. Whenever a fault occurs in a zone, the GIM index of that 
generator bus rises above the set threshold, and this is used to detect the faulted zone after which 
the positive sequence voltages of that zone is used to detect the bus closest to the fault.  
The dynamics of a generator following a fault is governed by: 
2
2
          m e a
d
M P P P
dt

= − =  
where M is the inertia constant,  is the rotor angle, mP  and eP  are the mechanical and electrical 
power respectively, and aP  is the accelerating power. During the dynamic behavior, the speed of 
the generator can be calculated in terms of the rotor angle as follows: 




 =  
The GIM is defined as: 
( )             
 is the gain in moment of each machine "i"
     moment of inertia of each machine "i"






















                





C. Faulted Line Identification 
The faulted line is identified in this algorithm by using the positive sequence voltage magnitude to 
determine the faulted bus and the reactive power flow information of the various lines connected 
to the faulted bus to determine the faulted line.  
When the GIM of a given BPZ exceeds the threshold, then the Local Protection Centre (LPC) in 
that zone is notified to monitor the PSVM of that zone in order to identify the bus closest to the 




( )             
 is the PSVM of the ith bus of the VPZ
 is the rated voltage magnitude












Following a fault inception on a transmission line, reactive power is fed to the fault point, hence 
the reactive power flowing on the faulted line rises above a given threshold. Figure 4.9 shows the 
flowchart for the algorithm.  







Figure 4.9: Flow Chart for WAP technique B 
 
4.5.1 Results of WAP Technique B implementation in MATLAB/Simulink 
The wide area protection technique is implemented on the IEEE 9-bus system. The power system 
was simulated using MATLAB Simulink without any fault and the GIM of the three generators 
were plotted as shown in Figure 4.10. Furthermore, a three-phase fault was simulated in all the 
zones of the IEEE 9-bus system and the corresponding GIM of all generators were plotted as shown 
in Figure 4.11. The change in GIM of the generators in the first 0.1 seconds following a fault are 
the criteria used in determining the faulted zone using this WAP technique. As depicted in Figure 
4.11, there is a significant change in the GIM of the generators in the zone where the fault occurs 
whiles the GIM of the other generators remains unchanged.  In Figure 4.12, the GIM of generator 
three after a fault was closely analyzed and the behavior show that, it is possible to use that as a 
fault detection criterion. The response time of the wide area protection technique to detect and 
clear faults, as well as the accuracy in detecting all types of faults, were analyzed as was done in 





Figure 4.10: GIM of the generators without fault, (a) on the same graph and (b) separately  
 
 
Figure 4.11: GIM of the generators after a three-phase fault is simulated in the respective zones 





Figure 4.12: Close analysis of GIM of generator three after fault occurrence on that zone 
 
4.5.2 Evaluation of WAP Technique B in MATLAB/Simulink 
The performance of the algorithm was evaluated in terms of its accuracy and fault clearing time in 
MATLAB/Simulink similar to WAP algorithm A. Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 show the current 
and voltage waveforms before, during and after a two phase (L-L) and a three phase (L-L-L-G) 
faults were simulated and cleared with the algorithm within 0.15 and 0.04 seconds respectively. 
The fault clearing time range of this algorithm is between 0.04 to 0.15 seconds. Table 4.5 shows 
the different faults clearing times recorded in the zones and Table 4.6 shows the faulted zones and 
lines detected by the algorithm and the actual lines and zones on which the fault occurred.  
 






Figure 4.14: Current and voltage waveforms before, during and after a three phase (L-L-L-G) 
fault in Simulink 
 
Table 4.5: Fault clearing times of WAP Technique B 
 Fault Clearing Time (seconds) 
Fault Type L-G L-L L-L-G L-L-L-G 
Zone 1 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Zone 2 0.04 0.04 0.022 0.02 














Table 4.6: WAP Technique B accuracy in detecting faults 
Faulted line Faulted Zone Type of fault Zone detected  Line detected  
 















































































































4.6 WAP Technique C [38] 
This algorithm also utilizes the formation of backup protection zones after which the faulted line 
within the faulted zone is detected. 
A. Formation of Backup Protection Zones (BPZ) 
The backup protection zones are formed based on the PMU placement and the network topology. 
A backup protection zone within the network topology consists of the lines and buses that are 
surrounded by a PMU equipped bus. The protection zones for this WAP technique is shown in 
Figure 4.15.  
 
Figure 4.15: IEE 9-bus power system with the zones of protection based on WAP technique C 
 
B. Faulted Zone Identification Algorithm 
Each BPZ is surrounded by PMUs as shown in Figure 4.15, therefore all the currents that enter a 
BPZ is measured by the corresponding PMUs. The sum of zero or positive sequence currents 
entering a zone is noted at pre-fault conditions. When a fault occurs, these currents rise above the 
threshold, hence the mth  zone with an increase in the zero or positive sequence currents entering 
the zone has the fault.  
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The thresholds for determining the pre-fault conditions of the mth  BPZ are defined in an adaptive 
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where the superscripts (0) and (1) represent the zero and positive sequence measurements 
respectively. 
min, mBPZ




th BPZI and is 
determined through the power system transient studies, it takes a value between 0 to 1 p.u. For any 
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 are constant coefficients determining 
(0)
, mth BPZ
I  and 
(1)
, mth BPZ
I respectively. By updating 
(1)
, ment BPZ
I , the threshold of the BPZs is adapted 
constantly according to the power system conditions. To implement this fault zone identification 
algorithm in a smart transmission grid, all generator buses must be equipped with PMUs.  
C. Faulted Line Identification  
Each BPZ is surrounded by PMUs and the internal buses have no PMU. A faulted BPZ containing 
pn  PMU buses and npn  non-PMU buses is shown in Figure 4.16. The faulted BPZ is considered as 
a sub-network which is connected to the remaining network by surrounding PMU buses.  ,ent iI is 
the total current entering the faulted BPZ through the ith PMU bus. 1f  and 2f are two end buses 
of the faulted line; f is a fictitious bus at the fault point; x is per-unit distance between fault point 
f  and bus 1f  and fI is the fault current injected into the fault point. In Figure 4.16, boundary 







PMU buses to these lines are 1 2, ,... nLI I I . 1 2, ,..., npV V V  are the voltages of the pn boundary PMU 
buses. 
Only voltage and current phasors measured by boundary PMU buses are available and used for 
the faulted line identification in the faulted BPZ. The voltages measured by these PMU buses can 
be expressed as; 
,
1
1,2,...,     
np
i if f ir ent r
r
V Z I Z I i np
=
= +  =  
where ,i jZ  is the i j−  element of the matrix Z.  
 
 
Figure 4.16: Analysis of faulted line in a BPZ 
 
Z is the bus impedance matrix of the faulted BPZ including fictitious bus f . The elements of Z 
can be calculated by utilizing the elements of 
0Z ; the pre-fault bus impedance matrix of the 
faulted BPZ, which does not include the fictitious bus f  hence the dimension is nb nb . The 





irZ is determined by utilizing the elements of 
0Z  as:  
 
And by neglecting the shunt capacitance of the faulted line ifZ  can be calculated as: 
0 0 0
1 2 1( ) 1,...,      if if if ifZ Z Z Z i nb= + −  =  
The currents of transmission lines which are connected to the PMU buses are measured by PMUs. 
According to the KCL, these currents can be expressed as follows: 
1 2






I V l nL
z
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= +  =  
where l  is the line that connects PMU bus 1l  to the non-PMU bus 2l . By substituting (4.16) into 
(4.20) we obtain: 
,
1
     1,...,     
pn
l lf f lr ent r
r
I C I C I r nL
=
= +  =  
where lrC  and lfC  are constants, calculated by the BPZ parameters.  
Equation (4.16) and (4.21) can be written in matrix form as: 
     Hu m=  



















The dimensions of HV and HI are 2Pn   and 2Ln  , respectively. These are constant matrices which 
are determined by BPZ parameters.  
In (4.22) vector m consists of two sub-vectors Vm and Im  as follows: 










The dimensions of Vm  and Im  are 1Pn   and 1Ln  , respectively. These are determined on the 
basis of the voltages and currents measured by PMUs and BPZ parameters.  
And u is the 2×1 unknown vector whose elements are as follows: 
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2
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If a fault occurs on one of the lines connected to a PMU bus, (4.20) and (4.21) are not valid for 
that line. Therefore in equation (4.22), the related row is deleted and the dimension of matrix 1H  
and vector 1m  will become ( 1) 2Ln −  and ( 1) 1Ln −  , respectively.  
In (4.22), matrix H and vector m are known and only vector u is unknown, on the other hand, this 
equation is linear. Hence, u can readily be estimated by the linear least square’s method and 
afterwards 1 2,u u  are specified as: 
( )( ) ( )( )* * * *1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1
      u h h h m h h h m
g
 =   −  
   
( )( ) ( )( )* * * *2 1 1 2 1 2 1
1
     u h h h m h h h m
g
 =   −  
   
where the dot and asterisk denote inner product and complex conjugate, respectively. 1h  and 2h








( )( ) ( )( )* * * *1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2        g h h h h h h h h =   −     
Therefore, the estimation of the fault location, i.e. x  is acquired as: 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
* * * *
1 1 2 1 2 1
* * * *
2 2 1 1 2 2
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The purpose of the algorithm is the determination of the faulted line in the faulted BPZ, which 
means the main unknown is the faulted line. For each line that belong to the faulted BPZ, this 
algorithm first supposes that the fault has occurred on that line, and next estimates the fault location 
x  by equation (4.29). The faulted line is the line who’s estimated x  is between 0 and 1. If more 
than one line satisfy this condition, then, for each of these suspected lines the relative residual error 



















 = − 
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The line, who’s estimated u  best matches the measured values, is selected as the faulted line. 
Which means, the line which has the least residual error is selected as the faulted line.   
4.6.1 Results of WAP Technique C Implementation in MATLAB/Simulink 
This WAP technique was implemented on the IEEE 9-bus power system shown in Figure 4.3 with 
zones of protection and the PMU buses as indicated. The no-fault condition was simulated and the 
sum of zero and positive sequence voltages entering the zones were recorded as shown in Table 
4.7. After that, selected fault conditions were simulated to analyze the behavior of the positive and 
zero sequence currents entering each protection zone, and these were also recorded in Table 4.7.  
4.6.2 Evaluation of WAP Technique C in MATLAB/Simulink 
The execution time of this WAP technique was investigated for all fault conditions to determine 







used to determine the fault clearing time. From the waveforms shown in Figure 4.17 and Figure 
4.18, the fault clearing time of 20 ms is the same for both two-phase and three-phase faults. The 
fault clearing time for this algorithm is the same for all the investigated fault conditions. Table 4.8 
shows the various fault clearing times and Table 4.9 shows the zones and lines detected and the 
actual zones and lines on which the faults were simulated. How the three algorithms compare is 
discussed in chapter 7. 
 
Table 4.7: Positive and zero sequence currents entering each protection zone 
Faulted Case  Positive and zero sequence current entering each zone 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
positive zero positive zero positive zero 




3.139 6.3e-14 2.95 1.2e-13 1.662 8.4e-14 
L-L 1.916 5.5e-5 1.884 4.7e-5 1.209 2.4e-5 




1.170 4.32e-14 2.571 1.5e-13 1.329 6.1e-14 
L-L 0.960 1.9e-5 1.648 4.5e-5 1.003 2.15e-5 




1.515 1.2e-13 1.133 1.1e-13 3.106 9.5e-14 
L-L 1.19 2.13e-5 0.8919 2.3e-5 1.875 5.5e-5 





Figure 4.17: Two-phase fault clearing time of the WAP Technique C during Simulink Simulation 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Three-phase fault clearing time of the WAP Technique C during Simulink 
Simulation 
 
Table 4.8: Fault clearing times of WAP Technique C 
 Fault Clearing Time (seconds) 
Fault Type L-G L-L L-L-G L-L-L-G 
Zone 1 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Zone 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 




Table 4.9: WAP Technique C accuracy in detecting faults 
Faulted line Faulted Zone Type of fault Zone detected  Line detected  
 















































































































CHAPTER FIVE: REAL-TIME SIMULATION USING OPAL-RT DIGITAL SIMULATOR 
In this chapter, simulating the models on the real-time target as well as the results of the real-time 
simulation of the wide area protection algorithms are presented and discussed.   
5.1 Executing Real-Time Simulation on OPAL-RT Simulator.  
The OPAL-RT allows MATLAB/Simulink to interface with the RT-LAB software where the 
simulation models created in Simulink can be modified into a compatible mode for execution on 
the OPAL-RT simulator. To run a simulation on the OPAL-RT, first, the system model that needs 
to be run in real-time must be created using Simulink and it must be running before converting it 
to a form that the simulator can read. When the model is in the right form, then it can be deployed 
onto the simulator through an ethernet cable where it is then executed in real-time. The output 
signals can then be taken from the real-time simulator with inputs and outputs connections (I/Os) 
and other communication protocols such as IEC61850, IEC104, C37.118. The signals can be 
measured using an oscilloscope or used to perform hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation. Figure 
5.1 shows a summary of real-time simulation using OPAL-RT simulator. Appendix B shows 
detailed explanation and figures of how the real-time simulation was carried out.   
 




5.2 Results of Real-time Simulation of the WAP Techniques 
The performances of the algorithms were tested during a real-time simulation on Opal-RT as was 
done during Simulink simulation. The time taken to clear faults in real-time as well as the accuracy 
of detecting all types of faults were analyzed. Figure 5.2 shows the model that was executed in 
real-time. The RT-LAB software and OPAL-RT target use only subsystems at the top level of the 
model, so the model depicted in Figure 5.2 shows the computation subsystem which contains the 
IEEE 9-bus system and the algorithm that is being tested whereas the console contains the switches 
and scopes for faults simulation, visualizing and analyzing of signals.  
During the real-time simulation, it is only the console that is accessible to the user on the user’s 
PC whiles the computation subsystem is loaded onto the real-time target which is why any block 
for fault simulation and scopes for viewing signals must be placed in the console. Figure 5.3 shows 
the console after the model has been loaded onto the target. The RT-LAB stamp in yellow which 
says ‘automatically generated by RT-LAB during compilation’ shows that the model is compiled 
and loaded successfully and ready for execution in real-time. 
 





Figure 5.3: The Model Console after successful compilation and loading onto the target. 
 
5.2.1 WAP Technique A Simulation in Real-Time on OPAL-RT.  
A fault on zone 3 of the IEEE 9-bus system was simulated and the voltage and current waveforms 
of all the PMU buses were recorded as shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5. The time taken to clear 
all types of fault were analyzed during the real-time simulation as was done in 
MATLAB/Simulink. Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show the current and voltage waveforms of a bus 
closest to the circuit breaker before, during and after a two-phase line-to-line and a three-phase 
line to ground fault in zone 3 were simulated and cleared with the algorithm. The waveforms show 








Figure 5.4: Voltages of PMU buses; before and after a fault on zone 3 during simulation in real-
time, zone 1 (a), zone 2 (b) and zone 3 (c)  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Currents of PMU buses; before and after a fault on zone 3 during simulation in real-











Figure 5.7: Current and voltage waveforms before, during and after a three-phase to ground 
fault in real-time 
 
5.2.2 WAP Technique B Simulation in Real-Time on OPAL-RT 
This Wide area protection technique was also executed in real-time on the Opal-RT target and the 
performance in terms of speed and accuracy were analyzed as was done during Simulink 
simulations. The Gain in the momentum of the generators without any fault and with a fault in the 
respective zones during real-time simulation are shown in Figure 5.8, also, the fault clearing times 
of the algorithm in real time are shown in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10. From Figure 5.8, it clearly 
shows that there is a significant change in the GIM of the generator in the zone at the time when 
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fault occurs.  Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 show that the faults were cleared in 0.03 sec and 0.02 sec 
respectively. 
 
Figure 5.8: GIM of the generators in real-time without fault (a) and with a fault on respective 
zones 1(b), 2(c) and 3(d) 
 
 






Figure 5.10: Two-phase fault clearing time of the WAP Technique B during real-time Simulation 
 
5.2.3 WAP Technique C Simulation in Real-Time on OPAL-RT 
This protection technique was also executed in real-time using the Opal-RT real-time simulator. 
The Figures 5.11 and 5.12 show the waveforms used to determine the fault clearing times of the 
wide area protection technique in real-time. How the three algorithms perform during 
MATLAB/Simulink and real-time is discussed in chapter 7.  
 





















 CHAPTER SIX:  HARDWARE-IN–THE–LOOP IMPLEMENTATION USING THE OPAR-RT 
DIGITAL SIMULATOR 
In this chapter, the process of simulating the various wide area protection techniques and 
evaluating their performances in terms of fault clearing time through hardware-in-the-loop using 
OPAL-RT and SEL-351A relay is presented and discussed. Detailed explanations of how the HIL 
simulation was achieved and the relevant figures are shown in appendix C. The purpose of the HIL 
simulation in this project is to verify additional time delay introduced by communication delay in 
the algorithms’ response times.    
6.1 External Hardware, Inputs and Outputs (I/Os)  
To perform hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing, the model running on the real-time target acts as 
the actual system and hence the analog and digital signals taken from the simulator is used to test 
the performance of the control hardware. In the case of this research, where the focus is on the 
protection of the power system, the control hardware here is the relay (SEL-351A) as shown in 
Figure 6.1; which also illustrates the tools and connections necessary to achieve HIL simulation 
using the OPAL-RT real-time target.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: HIL simulation for protection studies using a relay  [71] 
 
The signal output of the real-time target has a maximum of ±16 V peak signal, any signal value 
exceeding that value is truncated as shown in Figure 6.3. Hence, to perform a HIL test using the 
protective relays which require a higher voltage and current signals than the output of the target, a 
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voltage and a current amplifier is required. The connection diagram for HIL simulation using 
amplifiers is shown in Figure 6.2.  
However, as mentioned earlier in Chapter three, SEL relays provide a low-level test interface for 
testing the relays using low voltage signals up to a maximum of 9 V peak-to-peak. This made the 
interaction between the Opal-RT and the SEL-351A relay used in this research possible without 
the current and voltage amplifier. Figure 6.4 shows the low-level test interface of the SEL-35A 
relay. 
  
Figure 6.2: HIL simulation and testing of relays using current and voltage amplifiers 
 
Figure 6.3: Simulink Input signal and Opal-RT output signal during real-time simulation 
 
 





6.2 The Control Hardware for HIL simulation; SEL-351A Relay  
Performing a hardware-in-the-loop simulation requires external hardware often referred to as the 
hardware under test which will be inserted into the simulation loop. By inserting the hardware into 
the computer model, it enables the hardware device to go through realistic operation - just as it 
will in the actual field. SEL-351A relay is used in this research as the hardware under test. 
AcSELerator quickset software by SEL provides the platform for establishing a connection 
between the relay and a host PC to: read and change settings in the relay, read relay meter readings, 
retrieve relay events for reading by SEL synchroWAVe event software and a human-machine 
interface (HMI) to interact with the relay. The settings in the SEL relay include global, group, 
report, text, DNP and port settings. These settings allow the relay to be configured according to 
the particular application.  
6.3 SEL- 351A relay in the simulation loop of the IEEE 9-bus system  
The SEL-351A relay was placed in the computer simulation loop through the hardware-in-the-
loop implementation to record fault events as well as a trip in the events of a fault. The idea of the 
wide area protection is to send trip signals from a centralized protection centre to the relay and 
circuit breakers in the event of a fault, in this case, the trip logic and trip decision are taken out of 
the relay. However, the current relays (SEL-351A) are based on local protection where they are 
equipped with protection elements such as phase overcurrent elements, phase time overcurrent 
elements etc. which are set with threshold values obtained from the power system simulation so 
that the relay can detect a fault when those threshold values are exceeded. The phase time 
overcurrent element in the relay was set to respond to overcurrent conditions during a fault on a 
particular zone. This element controls the trip logic which also controls the output contact 
(OUT101).  
The relay generates sequential event recorder (SER) events whenever any of the elements listed in 
SER changed state. These SER events are readable and analyzable with the synchroWAVe event 
software which helps to know the elements that have triggered and the states of the various output 
contacts (OUT101 – OUT107) controlled by the states of the relay protection elements. The output 
contacts are responsible for opening and closing of the circuit breakers in the power system. In this 
research, whilst the local protection elements’ states were monitored in the SER to know their 
response to any fault events simulated, the WAP algorithm is used to control the breakers in the 
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power system and the voltage and current waveforms are monitored to know when the breaker 
opened or closed. This was necessary because it is not possible to implement the WAP in the relay 
since the idea of a WAP technique is to have the control logic in a centralized centre known as 
wide area protection centre or local protection centre. This aided the comparison of the response 
of conventional protection and the wide area protection.  
The relay which is the hardware under test was placed in the simulation loop and a two-phase line-
to-line fault (a-b) was simulated on zone 3. The events recorded by the SEL-351A relay were read 
and analyzed with the synchroWAVe event software and the scope in MATLAB/Simulink as 
shown in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 respectively.      
 






Figure 6.6: Current and voltage waveforms recorded with scope in Simulink before and after an 
L-L (a-b) fault 
 
A three-phase to ground (L-L-L-G) fault was also simulated and the current and voltage waveforms 
were recorded with both SEL-351A relay and the scope in MATLAB/Simulink as shown in the 
Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 respectively. These were done to analyze and verify the readings and 







Figure 6.7: Current and voltage waveforms recorded by SEL-351A relay before and after an L-
L-L-G (a-b-c-g) fault. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Current and voltage waveforms recorded by scope in Simulink before and after an L-
L-L-G (a-b-c-g) fault. 
 
6.4 Hardware-In-the-loop (HIL) Implementation of the WAP techniques.  
The HIL simulation of the WAP protection techniques was used purposely in this research to verify 
the response time of the various protection techniques under investigation. Using only the 
waveforms recorded in MATLAB/Simulink and during real-time simulation is not enough to 
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conclude on the response time of the protection algorithms. Since the SEL-351A relay is the actual 
control hardware that will be used in the power system when these algorithms are implemented, 
testing its behavior in the events of a fault through the HIL simulation helps to validate how it will 
respond to those same faults conditions in real-life.  
The phase time overcurrent elements were enabled (E51P) and set to respond to overcurrent 
conditions during fault simulations which in turn control the output contact OUT101 of the relay 
but not the circuit breakers in the power system. The circuit breaker in the power system simulation 
running in real-time on the Opal-RT is controlled by the WAP techniques. This setup helps to 
monitor the response time of both the conventional protection and the wide area protection.  
6.4.1 WAP Techniques Response to Fault Conditions during HIL Simulations  
The setup for the HIL simulations is shown in Figure 6.9. During the HIL simulations of various 
fault conditions on the IEEE 9-bus system, the WAP techniques were used to control the states of 
the circuit breakers in the power system running in real-time. The pre-fault, fault and post-fault 
events were recorded by the control hardware SEL-351A and these events were analyzed using 
synchroWAVe software by SEL. The response times of the WAP techniques were recorded as 
shown in Figure 6.10- Figure 6.12. How the three algorithms perform during MATLAB/Simulink 





Figure 6.9: The setup for the Experiment 
 
 






Figure 6.11: Response time of WAP technique B recorded by SEL-351A 
 
 





CHAPTER SEVEN: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Fault Detection Accuracy   
The three wide area protection techniques have been implemented in MATLAB/Simulink, real-
time simulation (i.e., software in the loop) using OPAL-RT and hardware-In-the-Loop simulation 
using SEL-351A relays. The performances of the WAP techniques were tested using IEEE 9-bus 
3-generator test system with three PMU buses. The simulation results show that all the three 
algorithms can detect faults on the power system with 100% accuracy in determining the faulted 
zone but an accuracy less than 100% in determining the faulted line. Figure 7.1 shows the 
percentage accuracy in determining the faulted line for the three WAP techniques. As shown in 
the figure WAP technique A has 86% accuracy level, WAP technique B has 94% accuracy and 
WAP technique C has 92% accuracy. The sources of errors that may contributes to this level of 
inaccuracies are due to the network topology with adjacent lines presenting similar characteristics 
in a given faulted condition, making it difficult for the algorithm to detect the actual faulted line.  
 
Figure: 7.1 Faulted line detection accuracy for the WAP techniques 
 
7.2 Fault Response and Clearing Time 
The speed of the protection techniques in clearing all faults conditions that occur on the power 
system was investigated and analyzed using current and voltage waveforms during Simulink, real-
time and HIL simulation. The fault response times during Simulink and real-time were similar but 
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far different from the HIL due to the communication delay between the real-time target and the 
SEL-351A relay. Whereas nothing can be done to the fault clearing time of the algorithms without 
communication which is purely based on the method and the data used, depending on the 
communication medium, the actual response time can be reduced. Figures 7.2 – 7.4 show the 
response times of the WAP techniques in the three different simulation type used. The response 
time of the WAP technique A during Simulink and real – time ranges from 15 ms to 35 ms. WAP 
technique B fault clearing time ranges from 15ms to 40 ms. For WAP technique C, it has the same 
fault clearing time for all types of fault and this is estimated as 20 ms. These faults clearing time 
variations depend on the data used in detecting the faulted zone as well as the faulted line. The 
more data the algorithm depends on to detect and clear faults the slower the fault clearing time. 
Moreover, the algorithms take data from all the PMUs and use that to distinguish the faulted zone 
from the rest, the quicker the value recorded from the PMU in the faulted zone is distinguished 
from the others, the faster the fault clearing time. 
This explains why the Technique A which uses the PSVM for faulted zone detection follows the 
expected trend of the fault clearing time for single phase to ground fault having the highest clearing 
time and three-phase to ground fault having the lowest fault clearing time. Also, Technique B 
which uses the GIM for faulted zone detection has similar fault clearing time for single-phase to 
ground faults and two-phase line to line faults. The fault clearing time is lower for two-phase line 
to ground faults and is lowest for three-phase to ground faults in all the zones. This is due the 
variations in GIM of the generators after each fault occurs in the zone. Furthermore, technique C 
uses the sum of positive and zero sequence currents entering a BPZ to detect the faulted zone. It 
was observed that this value (the sum of positive and zero sequence currents) of the PMU in the 
faulted zone varies significantly from the values at the other PMUs when any fault occurs and this 
explains why algorithm C has the same fault clearing time for all fault conditions as well as having 
averagely the lowest fault clearing time.  
With an added communication delay during the HIL simulation, the maximum fault clearing time 
of the techniques recorded were 404 ms, 256 ms and 150 ms for technique A, B and C respectively 





Figure:7.2 Fault clearing time of WAP technique A during the different simulation methods 
 
 



















CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
Various techniques for wide area protection of the power grid have been proposed which are 
mainly for backup protection purposes. Three of these methods have been carefully selected based 
on the data used for protection, method of protection, the purpose of protection, ease of 
implementation and scalability of the method.  
The investigations show that the wide area protection technique based on positive sequence voltage 
for faulted zone detection and positive sequence current for faulted line detection have 100% 
accuracy in detecting the faulted zone and 86% accuracy in determining the faulted line with 
maximum fault clearing time of 404 ms which includes the communication delay using ethernet 
communication with RJ45 cable. The wide area protection technique based on Gain in Momentum 
of the generators for faulted zone identification and the use of positive sequence voltage magnitude 
and flow of reactive power for faulted line identification has 100% accuracy in determining the 
vulnerable protection zones and 94% accuracy in determining the faulted line. This technique has 
a maximum fault clearing time including the communication delay which was tested using the HIL 
simulation to be 256 ms. And lastly, the third algorithm investigated based on the sum of currents 
entering the zone of protection for faulted zone identification and linear least square method for 
faulted line identification has 100% accuracy and 92% accuracy respectively and maximum fault 
clearing time of 150 ms which includes communication delay. From the performance data 
presented, it is evident that these algorithms will perform better when used as backup protection 
since the common timer settings for backup protection schemes range is from 1200 ms to 1800 
ms.  
With an advanced (fast) communication technology, the WAP algorithms fault clearing time could 
possibly be reduced such that it could be used for primary protection as stated in the research 
hypothesis. It is recommended that a hybrid of these algorithms be developed using the strengths 
of each algorithm to supplement the weakness of the other. For example, in the case of the WAP 
technique B which uses GIM of the generators to detect faulted zones, since some of generators in 
the new power systems do not have rotating parts e.g. solar power plants, this aspect of the 
technique can be replaced with the use of the sum of current entering each protection zone  
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proposed by WAP technique C to detect the faulted zone while retaining its (technique B) faulted 
line identification method which has a much higher accuracy.  
Future work will be looking at developing a more robust technique which has a higher accuracy 
for both faulted zone and faulted line identification. More efficient communication mediums like 
optical fibre cable, 5G technology could be used to investigate the technique to see its suitability 
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Appendix A: The IEEE 9-Bus System on MATLAB/Simulink Model 
 
Figure: A.1 IEEE Nine Bus Model on MATLAB/Simulink 
 
Table A.1 Terminal conditions of IEEE 9-bus system 
Bus V[kV] δ[deg] P[pu] Q[pu] 
1 17.1600 0.0000 0.7163 0.2791 
2 18.4500 9.3507 1.6300 0.0490 








Table A.2 Transmission line characteristics of IEEE 9-bus system 




4 5 0.0100 0.0680 0.1760 
4 6 0.0170 0.0920 0.1580 
5 7 0.0320 0.1610 0.3060 
6 9 0.0390 0.1738 0.3580 
7 8 0.0085 0.0576 0.1490 
8 9 0.0119 0.1008 0.2090 
 
 
Table A.3 Load characteristics of IEEE 9-bus system 
Bus P[pu] Q[pu] 
5 1.25 0.50 
6 0.90 0.30 
8 1.00 0.35 
 
APPENDIX B: Real-Time Simulation on Opal-RT 
B.1 Creating a Model Compatible for OPAL-RT Real-Time Simulation 
The OPAL-RT simulator only works with subsystems at the top layer level of a model. Simulink 
subsystem consists of a set of Simulink blocks that are placed in one single block which is known 
as a subsystem. This type of groupings helps to simplify the model, establish a hierarchical block 
diagram and keep blocks of similar functionality together. The objectives of having subsystems in 
RT-LAB platforms are to differentiate computation subsystems and Graphical User Interface 
(GUI) Subsystems and to assign different computation subsystems to CPU cores. The grouping of 





Figure B.1: Creating a subsystem in MATLAB/Simulink 
 
The Simulink blocks in a model for RT-LAB real-time simulation must be grouped into two; a 
computational subsystem and GUI subsystem. The computation subsystem will be executed in 
real-time on one CPU core of the OPAL-RT target or machine whiles the GUI subsystem will be 
viewed on the user’s host PC as shown in Figure B.2. The data between the computation subsystem 
and the GUI subsystem is exchanged asynchronously through a TCP/IP link.  The computation 
blocks can be divided into two subsystems especially for a large model with a lot of computational 
blocks. In this case, each computation subsystem will be run on a different CPU core of the real-
time target. The data between two computation subsystems is exchanged synchronously using 
shared memory.  
The subsystems of the RT-LAB have a naming convention which must be followed in order for 
successful execution in real-time; the GUI subsystem must have a pre-fix of SC before the name 
one wants to give the subsystem e.g. SC_anyname. The first or main computational subsystem 
must have the prefix SM and SS for any additional computational subsystem added since the 
computation subsystem can be more than one executed on different CPU cores. Figure B.2 gives 




Figure B.2: How the subsystems are executed on the OPAL-RT real-time target  [59] 
 
B.1.1 OpComm blocks in RT-LAB Simulation 
OpComm blocks are important in RT-LAB simulation because they are used for communication 
between the subsystems created in the Simulink model. There are two types of communication 
that happen within the RT-LAB real-time simulation; one is asynchronous communication which 
happens between a computation subsystem and a GUI subsystem and then synchronous 
communication between two computation subsystems. Whenever these communications need to 
be executed, a separate OpComm block is needed for each type of communication. The console or 
GUI subsystems need at least one OpComm block to receive asynchronous signals from 
computation subsystems but there can be multiple OpComm blocks with different data acquisition 
parameters. The computation subsystems need one OpComm block to receive an asynchronous 
signal from a console and a different OpComm block if it needs to communicate with another 
computation subsystem. The types of communications using Opal-RT OpComm blocks is shown 





Figure B.3: Using OpComm blocks in RT-LAB Simulations [59] 
 
B.2 Running the Models on the Real-Time Target 
In this section, establishing a connection with the real-time target, importing a Simulink model for 
execution in real-time is discussed and presented.  
B.2.1 Making Connections with the real-time target  
In order to execute a model on the real-time target, first of all, a TCP/IP connection must be 
established between the host PC and the target (Figure B.2). This connection is achieved through 
the RT-LAB software which must be installed on the host PC with a capability of integrating the 
appropriate MATLAB version onto it. The real-time target has its dedicated ethernet IP address 
(e.g. 192.168.10.x0x) and hence the host PC must also be assigned an IP address in order to make 
communication possible (e.g. 192.168.10.xxx). When the connection is established or the target is 
added to the RT-LAB software as referred by Opal-RT technologies, then the created model can 
be imported, assign to the target and then executed in real-time. The Figs. B.4 – B.5 shows the 
real-time target named UCT_targets in this case being added but disconnected in Figure B.4 and 




Figure B.4: RT-LAB software with the real-time target disconnected 
 
 
Figure B.5: RT-LAB software with the real-time target connected 
 
B.2.2 Adding an Existing Simulink Models for Execution in Real-Time 
The model created in the right form as discussed in the earlier sections may be added to an RT-
LAB project for real-time execution after the target is connected. One can create a new project for 
the model or add it to an existing project if there is already one. There are two ways of adding a 
Simulink model for execution; first, the model can be imported, in this case, a copy of the model 
is saved in the RT-LAB software directory and therefore any changes made to the model in the 
RT-LAB software will not reflect on the original model, this one is recommended. Also, the model 
can be linked with the RT-LAB software where the original model is used from its directory and 
therefore there is no copy in the RT-LAB directory.     
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B.2.3 Editing, Setting, Building, Loading and Executing the Model 
When the model is added to a project for execution on the real-time target, there are options for 
editing and setting execution parameters in order to get the right results. If there is nothing to be 
edited in the model, then the next thing before building or compiling is setting the development 
properties. A model that is not intended to send or receive analogue and digitals signals to external 
hardware, at the execution properties, the real-time simulation mode must be set to software 
synchronized as shown in Figure B.6. But if the model will send signals for measurement on an 
oscilloscope or for use in Hardware-in-the-loop testing or receive any signal from external 
hardware, the simulation mode must be set to hardware synchronized as shown in Figure B.7. At 
the assignation where we see the subsystem settings shown in Figure B.6 and Figure B.7, the eXtra 
High Performance (XHP) mode must be set to OFF for a software synchronized simulation and 
ON for a hardware synchronized simulation.  
When these settings are done correctly then the model is ready for building on the target. When 
the model is built successfully, a message showing that the building is successful and the time it 
took to build will be displayed as shown in Figure B.8, for a model built in this project. After the 
model is successfully built the next step is to load the model and then execute.  
 










Figure B.8: A build message showing that the model has been built successfully 
 
APPENDIX C: HIL Simulation with Opal-RT and SEL-31A Relay 
C.1. Simulink I/O blocks and Model Preparation for HIL Simulation.  
To measure the output signals from the real-time target with external hardware, the model created 
must be hardware synchronized as discussed earlier with the required blocks which are discussed 
in this section. The first step is that, the model to be executed in real-time and hardware 
synchronized must be put in a separate folder together with the bitstream (.bin) and the 
configuration (.conf) files. When these three (the Simulink model, the bitstream, and the 
configuration) files are in the same folder as shown in Figure C.1, then the model is ready for 
importing, editing and execution. These extra files are provided by OPAL-RT and they represent 




Figure C.1: Folder showing the model with the bitstream and the configuration file 
 
When the model is imported into the RT-LAB environment, it must be edited with the necessary 
I/O blocks so that the real-time target can output the required signals for measurement or HIL 
simulation. The first block needed is an OpCtrl block which tells the model that we are going to 
use ML605 FPGA board in this case; which allows for driving the analog and digital I/O card 
located in the simulator. OpCtrl block handles synchronization and sets internal parameters. Figure 
C.2 shows the internal settings required for the OpCtrl block.  
 
Figure C.2: Setting the requirement of an OpCtrl block  [59] 
 
In this project, the signals measured as well as used for HIL simulation are both analog and digital 
signals, hence the model used analog and digital inputs and outputs (I/Os) blocks. Figure C.3 
shows the concept of I/Os as used in OPAL-RT real-time simulation. The Analog IN and Digital 
IN blocks take electrical signals from external hardware to the users’ (simulation) environment, 
models, algorithms etc. whilst the Analog OUT and Digital OUT blocks send signals out of the 
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users' environment to external hardware for measurement with an oscilloscope or for HIL 
simulation using control hardware.  
 
   
Figure C.3: The concept of Analog/Digital Inputs and Analog/Digital Outputs in OPAL-RT  [59] 
 
C.2 Adding an I/O block to the Model  
This section discussed how to add Analog Input and Analog Output blocks which are used for this 
project, the analog is discussed, however, the same concept applies for Digital Inputs and Digital 
Outputs. The Analog OUT and Analog IN blocks have these internal settings which must match 
as described here before execution. The controller name should be the same as the OpCtrl block 
name, the number of channels must be set to 8 and the mux and de-mux blocks must have the same 
dimensions. The DataIn and DataOut port number for Analog OUT and Analog IN blocks 
respectively are given in the system description as shown in Figure C.4 for the real-time target 










Figure C.5: The settings for digital I/O blocks parameters as given in the system data used for 
the project. 
C.3 Taking Signals Out and Into to the Real-time Simulator  
When using I/Os in the simulation, the signals generated may need to be measured, use to test 
control hardware or you will need to input a signal from hardware into the real-time simulator to 
control the simulation running in real-time. The user interface for making a connection to external 
hardware is the DB37 connector, knowing the full pin description of the DB37 connector is 
paramount to a successful connection to external hardware. These full pin descriptions for analog 
and digital inputs and outputs are given in the system documentation provided by Opal-RT for the 
particular target. The analog I/Os have 16 inputs and 16 outputs channels whereas the digital I/Os 
have 32 inputs and 32 outputs channels. Figure C.6 shows the pin assignment of the DB37 
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connector, Vuser is a reference voltage that needs to be provided by the user from an external 
source, this reference voltage is only required for digital out signals.  
 
Figure C.6: DB37 connector pin assignment. 
 
C.3.1 Measuring Signals 
There are two ways of doing these; one is the loopback method which required using the loopback 
connector for connection at the rear and the second is using an external scope which requires RJ45 
connector at the front panel, both methods can be combined together.  
A. Loopback Method    
The loopback method involves connecting output channels to input channels at the rear of the 
target (simulator) so that signals generated by the target can be acquired again by the target and 
monitored in the model console. Making a loopback connection for analog and digital signals are 






Figure C.7: Making Loopback connection at the rear of the target  [59] 
 
 
Figure C.8: Loopback connection at the rear of the OPAL-RT Chasis  [59] 
 
B. Using an External Scope  
The front panel enables the measurement of output and input signals in and out of the simulator. 
The RJ45 cable, as well as the BNC cable, are used to make the connections as shown in Figure 





Figure: C.9 Using the scope to measure signals from OPAL-RT  [59]  
 
C.3.1 Outputting /Inputting signals to and from an external hardware 
To perform hardware-in-the-loop simulation, this aspect of the real-time simulation is important 
since we need signals to test the control hardware as well as take signals into the simulator to 
perform actions on the running model. This involves using the PCB board and making the pin 
connection according to the system description. The pin connections are shown in Figure C.10 - 
C.12 for analog and digital inputs and outputs signals.   
 





Figure C.11: Digital 32 channel outputs connection of the DB37 connector 
 
 







APPENDIX D: Analysis of different Types of Faults on a Simple Power Systems   
A simulation was carried out to analyze the behavior of different types of faults that occur in the 
power system and these were tested using power systems of different number of buses. Figure D.1 
and Figure D.2 show the power systems simulated and Table D.1 – Table D.2 show the values 
obtained from the simulations for no fault conditions and fault conditions. 
The results in Table D.1 and Table D.2 indicate that the symmetrical faults (L-L-L and L-L-L-G) 
which are the faults of the highest magnitude that can occur are identical and even have similar 
values. The fault current is high at the bus closets to the fault and this characteristic is used for 
overcurrent protection setting in the power system. 
Further, across all scenarios considered as shown in Table D.1 to Table D.2, it was observed that 
using only the variation in current or voltage for fault detection can be sometimes misleading and 
affect the security and dependability of the protection system. Therefore, in most protection 
algorithms different parameters are being used for fault detection. These parameters include 
positive sequence current or voltage magnitude, sequence angle etc.  
 
A. A Two Bus Power System with Fault at One Bus   
 
 






Table D.1 Voltages and currents of a two-bus power system with no fault and fault conditions 
Type of Fault Voltage (p.u) Current (p.u) 
No fault 1.048 0.8684 
L-L(a-b) 0.9875 3.908 
L-L(a-c) 0.845 4.509 
L-L(b-c) 0.1425 0.894 
L-L-L(a-b-c) 0.000194 4.849 
L-L-L-G(a-b-c-g) 0.000194 4.849 
L-G(a-g) 1.146 1.224 




B. A Two Bus Power System with Fault at both Buses  
 







Table D.2: Voltages and currents of a two-bus power system with no fault and fault conditions 
on both buses 
Fault Bus No-Fault 
 
 




























  V      |     I 
 
F1 
A 1.048 0.86 1.02 0.81 1.02 0.81 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.85 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.95 1.1 0.96 




A 1.048 0.86 1.9e-4 4.849 1.9e-4 4.849 0.98 3.9 0.84 4.5 0.142 0.89 1.19 3.9 1.1 1.2 
B 0.95 0.39 1.7e-4 7e-5 1.7e-4 7e-5 0.81 0.33 1e-2 7e-3 0.83 0.34 0.7 0.32 0.92 0.39 
 
 
 
 
